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ABSTRACT 
A successful competition policy is a necessary element in the efficient operation of 
market economies. To be successful, however, competition policy needs to be backed up 
by effective competition enforcement. This paper examines the questions whether the 
New Zealand competition law enforcement regime, though amended in 2001, could 
benefit from further reform. It reveals that doubts as to the effectiveness and ultimate 
success of the current system are justified. This is in particular trne for the imposition of 
appropriate penalties and the private remedy of damage actions. To explore alternative 
enforcement processes and tools, the paper applies a comparative analysis of the compe-
tition enforcement regimes of New Zealand, Germany and the United States. In the 
course of the analysis two reform options emerge: The conferment of the power to im-
pose penalties to the New Zealand Commerce Commission and the introduction of a 
multiple damages provision. The paper scrntinises each of these options as to their ad-
vantages and possible disadvantages. It comes to the conclusion that neither option faces 
insurmountable obstacles and suggests that the ew Zealand Parliament should not 
hesitate to seriously consider these options if the 2001 amendments ultimately fail to 
succeed. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography 
and appendices) comprises approximately 16,034 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
A successful competition policy is a pivotal element in the efficient operation of a 
market economy. Since market mechanisms are endangered through monopolistic or 
other anti-competitive practices, a strong competition law is required to promote com-
petitive markets and ensure the efficient allocation of resources. To be strong, however, 
any competition law needs to be backed up by efficient Jaw enforcement. As a matter of 
fact, investigation and enforcement of breaches of competition law require significant 
time and resources. Therefore, competition enforcement authorities are under an ongo-
ing commitment to optimise their enforcement activity, and legislators should constantly 
review the existing enforcement regime to provide enforcement authorities with the 
most efficient and appropriate enforcement tools available. 
The New Zealand legislator has recently acted accordingly and modified its compe-
tition law enforcement regime to address certain enforcement and deterrence deficien-
cies. 1 The amendment of the Commerce Act in 2001 was accompanied by an intense 
discussion and subsequently concerns have been voiced as to the effectiveness of some 
of the changes. In fact, there are several factors that justify some doubts as to the ulti-
mate success of the amendments. This paper will, therefore, explore the existing compe-
tition law enforcement regime and examine the question whether further reforms to the 
New Zealand enforcement regime are advisable and which means are appropiiate. The 
examination will, thereby, focus on the administrative and the private aspect of en-
forcement, leaving criminal enforcement essentially aside. 
To provide answers to the above questions, the paper applies a comparative analysis 
of the enforcement regimes of New Zealand, Gem1any and the United States. Ger-
many's competition law enforcement system heavily relies on administrative enforce-
ment and, thus, might serve as a model for reforms in this area. The United States 
system provides a good example for the importance and impact of private enforcement 
as a means of deterrence, and, consequent ly, some inspiration will be drawn from that. 
Commerce Amendment Act 200 I . 
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In a competition law context the concept of "enforcement" is often very broadly 
used and refers, inter alia, t') investigation, remedies and subsequent judicial review. 
This paper focuses on the sanctioning aspect of enforcement, which means penalties and 
remedies; therefore, reference to investigations or judicial review is only made where 
necessary. Administrative powers such as the authorisation of restrictive trade practices 
or mergers are not covered. Also, enforcement authorities may be responsible for a 
broad variety of general and specific regulatory regimes. Enforcement activities may 
concern fair trade practices as well as specific industries like the telecommunications or 
the electricity lines industry. To create a comparable basis, this paper will only focus on 
the enforcement of the 'general' competition law of each country. Therefore, the legisla-
tion relevant for this paper will be the national law that primarily aims at the protection 
of the concept of competition as such rather than promoting fair trade or regulating spe-
cial industrial sectors. Complementary legislation providing rules for enforcement pro-
ceedings and the like will be considered as required. 
The examination will proceed in three parts. First, the paper explores the competi-
tion law enforcement regimes of New Zealand, Germany and the United States. It will 
outline the main enforcement remedies and procedures and, to some extent, assess and 
discuss their effectiveness. The second part conducts a comparative analysis of the three 
jurisdictions, focussing on the role and importance of each the public and the private 
sector in competition law enforcement. In the third part, the focus is on the question 
whether any options for refonning the New Zealand system can be derived from the 
results of the analysis. Two options for further reform are extracted and closely exam-
ined: The power to impose pecuniary penalties conferred to the Commerce Commis-
sion; and the introduction of a multiple damages provision. The paper concludes that 
there is something to be said for both options to make an improvement to the current 
system if the recent changes made to the Commerce Act ultimately fail to achieve their 
goal. 
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II ENFORCEMENT REGIMES IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES 
A New Zealand 
The former New Zealand Ministry of Commerce summarised its view of competi-
tion law enforcement in a discussion document "Penalties, remedies and court processes 
under The Commerce Act 1986" published in January 1998.2 It stated that: 
A Jaw has little effect unless it is efficiently enforced. Penalties and remedies under 
the Commerce Act should support the goals of the Act by deterring anti-competitive 
conduct. Court processes should not hinder the goals of the Act and should balance 
justice and efficiency.3 
This document marked the beginning of the most recent review of New Zealand's 
competition law set out in the Commerce Act 1986 ("the Act"). The review revealed 
that the existing enforcement regime failed to achieve sufficient deterrence of anti-
competitive behaviour and led to the enactment of the Commerce Amendment Act 2001 
(2001 No 32) in May 2001. In terms of enforcement, the Amendment Act, inter afia, 
increased corporate penalties, introduced cease and desists orders, and empowered the 
courts to award exemplary damages. 
Some of these modifications have been blamed as an unneeded result of the popular 
'cry for tougher sentences'. 4 Others have not yet had a chance to prove their usefulness 
in practice. However, the amendment and the preceding discussion show that the New 
Zealand legislator is aware of the significance of law enforcement for an effective com-
petition policy and is willing to adopt modifications to the current system, if and as nec-
essary. 
New Zealand (NZ) Ministry of Commerce Penalties. remedies and court processes under Th e Com-
merce A et 1986: A discussion docum enr (Wellington, January 1998) 
< htl[L \\ ,, \\.mcd. ,o,·t.nz. buslt [,us ol p_cna]tic~. df'> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
Z Ministry of Commerce, above, l . 
Ian Millard "Penalties and Remedies" in Mark Berry & Lewis T Evans (eds) Competirion Law at 
the Turn of the Centwy A New Zea land Perspective (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2003) 
194. 
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1 Public enforcement bodies 
Two institutions are concerned with the public enforcement of New Zealand ' s 
competition law, the Commerce Commission and the High Court. 
(a) The Commerce Commission 
The Commerce Commission ("the Commission") is a statutory body corporate, 
which was originally established by the Trade Practices (Commerce Commission and 
Pyramid Selling) Act 1974. Its purpose is to apply and enforce the Commerce Act 1986, 
the Fair Trading Act 1986 and specific regulatory legislation such as the Electricity In-
dustry Reform Act 1998. The Commission ' s enforcement activities cover investigation, 
litigation, and the provision of information to the public.5 The Commission consists of a 
Chair, a Deputy Chair, and no more than six other Commissioners, all of which are ap-
pointed for a five years term appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation 
of the Minister of Commerce. 6 The Commission has approximately 110 staff and offices 
in Wellington, Auckland and Christchurch.7 In the 2001 /2002 year the Commission had 
a total annual budget of NZ$ 17 million.8 In exercising its functions the Commission 
shall have regard to the economic policies of the government as transmitted to the 
Commission by the Minister of Commerce pursuant to section 26(1) of the Act. Apart 
from that, the Commission is independent of both the political and the executive 
branches of government. 9 
Though often being referred to as "New Zealand ' s competition enforcement 
agency", 10 the Commission has more of a prosecution rol e than a decision-making role 
5 New Zealand (NZ) Commerce Commission Regulato,y Con trol and Enforcement Activities of the 
Commerce Commission 200 I /2002 (Wellington, 2002) 7 <htt.12_: \\W\\ ._c:oml:'Qlll. 1ovt.1v · 
about ·_documents.Rcgulatorv0 o ?OC'Qnt r91" n ?Oand%20En for~~n1l'nt(l n2Q_,\ t; t 1\,: 1 tic_s0 _'22_0o f":.c!f.Qth~%,_2Q(:Q 
mmcrcc'\1.20Commission° 920200 1-2002.pctt> (last accessed 7 October 2003 ). 
6 Commerce Act 1986, ss 9, I 0. 
Z Commerce Commission, above, 8. 
Organisa tion for Economic Coopera ti on and Development (OECD) Competition Law and Policy -
Annual Report of New Zealand 200 l -2002 (Pari s, France, 2002) 11 <http_: W\\'W_.QC.fd.Qig 
datarn:cd ~-l 13 '2488976.pdf> (las t accessed 7 October 2003). 
9 NZ Commerce Commission Memorandum of Understanding between the Minister of Commerce and 
the Commerce Commission 2002/2003 (We llington, 2003) 5 <htlf) : \\\,\ \\ ctimc_orn.gO\ L.n/abguL_ 
rn_Q u \10l 2_0(_)2.pgf (last accessed 7 October 2003); see also John I I Fan ar, John F Bu1Tows and Wil-
li ams Leys (eds) Bullerworths Commercial Law in New Zealand (4 ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 
2000) 559. 
10 OEC D, above, 2. 
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in competition enforcement. Since it can generally neither determine that the Act has 
been breached nor impose penalties or injunctions, the Commission's primary function 
is the investigation of alleged breaches and the commencement of proceedings in the 
High Court for contraventions of the Act. 11 Only the recently introduced cease and de-
sist orders provide the Commission with the power to tenninate conduct that is, prima 
facie, in breach of the Act, by way of an administrative injunction. 12 
(b) The High Court 
In terms of enforcement the High Court ("the Court") is the most important deci-
sion-making body. 13 Under section 75(1) of the Act, the Court has jurisdiction to deter-
mine a wide variety of proceedings. It may order contraveners to pay pecuniary penalties 
or damages or grant permanent or interim injunctions. Other orders include the exclu-
sions of certain persons from management of a body corporate (section 80C), and the 
varying or cancelling of contracts deemed to contravene the Act (section 89(2) of the 
Act). To ensure that the Court has the necessary economic expertise to decide Com-
merce Act cases, section 78 of the Act provides that, on the application of any party to 
the proceedings, or on the Court's own motion, an additional lay member may be ap-
pointed to hear and detem1ine competition enforcement issues. 14 
2 Enforcement by the Commission 
When an investigation produces evidence that a person has probably breached the 
Act, the Commission has several options for taking enforcement action. 15 Some of these 
options, like warnings and settlements, are not governed by the Commerce Act but nev-
ertheless acknowledged and the respective procedures are set out in guidelines issued by 
the Commission. 
11 Rex J Ahdar "Antitrust Policy in ew Zealand: The Beginning of a ew Era" ( 1992) 9 International 
Tax and Business Lawyer 329, 338. 
11 Commerce Act 1986, ss 74A-D. 
13 John H Farrar, John F Burrows and Williams C S Leys (eds) Buttenvorths Commercial Law in New 
Zealand (4 ed, Butterworth , Wellington, 2000) 561. 
14 Commerce Act 1986, s 78. 
15 These options are listed in NZ Commerce Cornnussion Regu/ato,y Control and Enforcement Activities 
of the Commerce Commission 200/ /2002 (Wellington, 2002) 8 <h!J~V\\\\ ,LQ_mc.:_gm,gQ_vt.nz 
abQut documents Regulator:i ' ,20( ontroi 0 'o2Qa nd",!!20 I :n forccmcnt"2_'.!_0i\ct J\ itics" !!20n f'' o20the'}!!.20( 'Q 
mmcn.:c" 1120( omm1'2_sarn 111,202001-200_.2_111lf'> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
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(a) 'Soft' enforcement measures - Warnings and settlements 
If the alleged breach is neither deliberate nor significant the Commission may issue 
a warning letter. 16 The aim of such an informal letter is to inform the person in question, 
to stop the behaviour and to deter future i \legal behaviour. These warnings may be pub-
licised. In terms of enforcement of the Commerce Act, warnings play a negligible role: 
In 2001/2002 only five of 125 investigations conducted by the Commission under the 
Act resulted in warnings (all of which concerned restrictive trade practices). 17 In com-
parison, during the same year 186 warnings resulted from 437 Fair Trading Act 
investigations. 18 The Commission may also negotiate settlements with contraveners 
where there is a serious breach of the Act, which the business acknowledges. 
Settlements aim at modifying the behaviour in question, too, but may also seek redress 
for the affected parties. Staff settlements take the form of signed undertakings to alter 
the impugned conduct and introduce, e.g., compliance programs. Commission 
settlements are similar in nature, but are reserved for cases involving significant market, 
major market participants or conduct having a significant impact on competition. 19 All 
settlements are published in the Commission's newsletter. If the Commission is unable 
to agree the terms of a settlement with a business, it will proceed to prosecution. In 
2001/2002 only two applications for extensions of the timeframe for divestment 
undertakings ansmg from earlier clearance decisions were resolved by way of 
settlement. 20 
(b) Cease and desist orders 
Cease and desist orders are administrative orders that restrain a certain conduct or 
that require a person to do something. According to section 74A(l) of the Act the re-
sponsible Commissioner will make such an order if it is necessary to act urgently in the 
public interest or in order to prevent damages. Pursuant to section 95 of the Act, cease 
16 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law (Brookers, Wellington, 1994, Commerce Act 1986 - Investiga-
tion and Enforcement Criteria) vol 1, Appendix I - 22 (last updated 13 March 2003). 
17 NZ Commerce Commission Annual Report 2001/2002 (Wellington, 2002) 28-29 
<http: ~ \\'W.COmCOl11. >O\ l.117 ~QQL_ll UOC\lnlents rQmlllt'\nn_j{t?p_Qrt2m) J -20(_}2.J)_d f> (last accessed 7 
October 2003). 
18 Commerce Commission, Annual Report. above, 31. 
19 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law, above, App I - 24, para C 2-4. 
2° Commerce Commission Annual Report 2001/2002 (Wellington 2002) 28-30 hup: \\W•\.CQmCQlll. 
gQ\ l.n/ about document_<, ~·51111111.\nn RcJlml~(lO 1-2002_Jl\Jf' (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
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and desist orders remain in force pending detem1ination of any appeal which supports 
the deterrent effect of these orders. 
An intense discussion had preceded the introduction of cease and desist orders in 
2001 .2 1 The Commission was against it because it considered the ability to apply for an 
interim injunction was a sufficient safeguard. However, the Commerce Committee pro-
posed cease and desist orders as a desirable supplement to interim injunctions because 
they would avoid the high costs and delays associated with litigation under the Act.22 It 
also considered that cease and desist orders had advantages over administrative settle-
ments because "[t]o be effective such settlements need to be backed up with the threat 
of court action" which would not be the case with cease and desist orders.23 Finally, the 
Commerce Committee argued that empowering the Commission to issue cease and de-
sist orders would improve transparency in the processes and procedures of the Commis-
sion which would enhance the perception of the Commission among the business 
community. One year after sections 74A to 74D coming into force, it still remains to be 
seen, what impact cease and desist orders will have on competition law enforcement in 
New Zealand. As far is the author is aware, the Commission has not yet issued such an 
order but is developing its approach to this new enforcement option.24 
3 Enforcement by the High Court 
Where there has been a deliberate breach of the Act, the Commerce Commission 
will consider taking civil action. The Commission may institute court proceedings seek-
ing example pecuniary penalties, injunctions, and, in respect of business acquisitions, an 
order for divestiture of assets or shares. 
11 See Z Ministry of Commerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act 
I 986: A discussion document (We llington, January 1998) 39 et seq.; Brooker 's Ca ulr on Commercial 
l aw (Brookers, Wellington, 1994, Commerce Act 1986) 3-274, paras CA 74A.04-05 (las t updated 18 
April 2002). 
22 Brooker 's Gault on Co n1111 ercia/ l tnv, above, para CA 74A .04 . 
13 Brooker 's Gaulr 0 11 Conunercial La,v, above, para CA 74A .04 . 
24 Z Comn1erce Conuniss ion Regulato ,y Control and Enfo rce,nent Activities of the Conunerce Co,n-
mission 200 I /2002 (Wellington 2002) 8 <hUp: \\ \\ \\_,c_<2111com._gg, t.rv ahout docurm:llls Re ,uJatorv 
'"r,20Control'\, 20and" 020 f- nforccment'%2_Q1\ct1, 1 t re~ '".,20<) f",o20the'' o'.20( ornmcrcc 0 ~,20Comm1ss1on%,2 
02QO 1-20_.!2_2_.Jl!JI> (last accessed 7 Oc tober 2003). 
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(a) Pecuniary penalties 
Under section 80 of the Act the Court may impose a pecuniary penalty on a person 
who has breached a provision of the Act relating to restrictive trade practices. Section 
80 sets out two maximum penalties (one for individual and one for corporate offenders), 
which apply to all offences under Part II of the Act. Individuals may be ordered to pay a 
pecuniary penalty of up to $500,000. To further deter individuals, the Court must im-
pose a penalty on an individual contravener, unless there is good reason not to. 
This focus on deterring individuals is further supported by sections 80A and 80C, as 
inserted by the Commerce Amendment Act 2001. Section 80A provides that companies 
cannot indemnify their directors, servants, or agents from liability for pecuniary penal-
ties or for costs incurred by defending any proceedings with respect to price fixing. Sec-
tion 80C enables the Court to order that individuals are excluded and banned from 
management of a body corporate for up to five years. These amendments were consid-
ered important features to deter individuals more effectively.25 However, the (deterrent) 
effect of both provisions remains to be seen. Section 80A(l )(a) could well be read as if 
only referring to indemnity for price fixing, thus allowing general indemnity clauses.26 
The exclusion and banning from management functions in any body corporate is a very 
harsh sanction, which may amount to an occupational ban. Quite likely, such a ban will 
only rarely, if ever, be sought. 
The maximum penalty for bodies corporate is the greater of S 10,000,000 or three 
times the value of any commercial gain resulting from the contravention. Since it is of-
ten very difficult to ascertain such additional proceeds, subsection 80(2B)(b )(ii)(B) pro-
vides that the Court may also order to pay 10 per cent of the (annual) turnover of the 
body corporate and all of its interconnected bodies corporate. 
The High Court may also impose a pecuniary penalty for breach of section 47 con-
cerning prohibited business acquisitions. 27 The maximum penalties here are $500,000 
25 Jill Mallon & Jenny Stevens "Commerce Act Penalties for Individuals" (2001) NZLJ 339; prior to the 
amendments, individuals had been penalised in only three Commerce Act cases: Commerce Commis-
sion ,, BP Oil New Zealand [1992) I ZLR 377; Commerce Commission " Wrightson NMA Ltd 
( 1995) 5 ZBLC 99-346; Commerce Commission v Christchurch Transport Ltd (21 August 1998) 
High Court Christchurch CP 72/98. 
26 Mallon & Stevens, above, 341. 
27 Commerce Act 1986, s 83( I) . 
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for individuals and $5,000,000 for bodies corporate. The Commerce Amendment Act 
2001 left the maximum corporate penalty relating to prohibited business acquisitions 
unchanged. The reason for this might have been that, so far, Courts have not imposed 
any penalties under section 83.28 
Although the Commission has conducted the investigation and is probably most 
familiar with a particular case, it is to the Court's discretion to determine the appropriate 
amount of the penalty having "regard to all relevant matters". 29 New Zealand Courts 
traditionally refer to a list of relevant factors set out in the Australian decision of TPC v 
Annand & Spencer Pty Ltd. 30 These factors include: 
• Whether the conduct was deliberate; 
• Whether damage was caused to the public or to the retailer; 
• The size of the corporation's activity in the relevant market; 
• The degree to which conduct was initiated or condoned by senior management; 
• Whether there has been similar conduct in the past; 
• Whether the corporation has made a full and frank disclosure and cooperated 
with the Commission. 
Other factors that have been influential in the Court's decisions are: 
• The need for penalties to be set at a deterrence level; 
• The signal given by the statutory increase of the maximum penalties; 
• The difficulty in detecting breaches; 
• The lack of evidence on the quantum of the damage; 
• The lack of clear guidance as to quantum of penalties provided by the cases; 
• The costs of the Commission taking the case. 31 
28 For a table setting out the penalties imposed by the Commerce Commission between 1990 and 2000 
see Ian Millard "Penalties and Remedies" in Mark N Beny & Lewis T Evans (eds) Competition law 
at the Turn of the Cent111y - A New Zealand Perspective (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2003) 
194, 198. 
29 Conunerce Act 1986, ss 80(2A), 83(2). 
30 TPC v A 1111and & Spencer Pty Ltd ( 1987) 9 A TPR 40-772 (FCA). 
3 1 Z Min is try of Commerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act I 986: A 
discussion docum ent (Wellington, January 1998) 18. 
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Moreover, sections 80(2A) and 83(2) of the Act specify which factors the Court 
must " in particular" take into account when detem1ining the amount of the penalty. 
These factors include the extent of any commercial gain a corporate body may have ob-
tained through the breach, the nature of the prohibited conduct, the damage any person 
has suffered from the offence and any past offending. Although the Commerce Amend-
ment Act 2001 altered the factors specified in section 80(2A),32 it is considered to be 
likely that the Court will continue to observe the traditional set of factors but attribute 
more or less importance to certain factors in accordance with the 2001 alterations. 33 
Apparently, the above factors have provided sufficient guidance about the appropri-
ate level of penalties to enable the Commission in a significant number of cases to reach 
agreements with the offenders as to the amount of the penalty. In fact, in 12 out of 16 
cases between 1994-2000, in which penalties were imposed, the Commerce Commis-
sion presented an agreed penalty to the Court. 34 Comparing court-imposed and negoti-
ated penalties, the Commission observed that it has been "more successful in obtaining 
higher penalties where it has been able to present the court with a penalty agreed with 
the defendant."35 
The reason for Parliament doubling the corporate penalty under section 80 of the 
Act in 2001 was the perception that Courts had been setting penalties at a too low level 
to achieve sufficient deterrence. 36 In 1998, Peter Allport, then Chainnan of the Com-
merce Commission, complained that the "penalties imposed by Courts have been con-
sistently considerably lower than penalties agreed by the Commission and the defendant 
and then approved by the Court."37 In fact , until 1998, the highest penalty for a single 
contravention had been $300,000, which accounted for only six per cent of the (then) 
32 Fornier s 80(2) was identica l to s 83(2), con1prising all the factors speci fi ed there. 
33 Jill Mallon & Jenny Stevens "Pena lties fo r Corporate Offe nders" (200 1) ZLJ 389. 
34 For instance Commerce Commission v Toyo ta New Zealand Ltd (9 September 1997) High ourt Wel-
lington CP95/95; Commerce Commission v DB Breweries ltd (28 November 1997) High Court Auck-
land CL35/97; Commerce Commission v Taylor Preston Limited & Ors (No . 2) ( 1998) ZBLC 
l 02,598; Commerce Commission v Eli Li!!y and Co. (New Zealand) ltd (30 April 1999) High Court 
Auckland C L l 9/98, 6; sec also Z Ministry of Commerce, above, 18 fn . 44. 
35 Z Commerce Comm.iss ion Penalties. Remedies and Court Processes under the Commerce Act l 986 
(subrn.iss ion to M inistry of ommerce, March 1998) para 2 1 
<htt!l: \V\,\\\ .comcom . .gmt.n/ publ11.: auons (i t:t l ilc.C'l ·v1'!Doc_ ll) (>~&hlcnamc PI '\Al I Y.l'DI > 
(las t accessed 7 October 2003 ). 
36 NZ M i111 stry of Commerce, above, 3 1. 
37 Peter A ll port "Competition Law "An Evo lution"" ( 1998) Z LJ 275. 
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maximum amount of $5,000,000.38 After the imposition of the highest single pecuniary 
penalty to date ($1,500,000) in Commerce Commission v Taylor Preston Ltd39 , there 
appears to be a trend to slightly higher pecuniary penalties.40 
However, in Commerce Commission v Giltrap City Ltd, the Court again imposed a 
pecuniary penalty well below what the Commission wanted despite several factors that 
were in favour of a large penalty.41 The Court found that the conduct of the defendant 
was deliberate and performed by senior management. It accepted the Commission's 
submission that the defending company had a high standing, large size, and had more 
extensive financial resources in contrast to other like businesses.42 Finally, the court 
found that the defendant had only co-operated with the Commission little more than it 
was legally obliged to. Despites these findings, the Court only imposed a pecuniary pen-
alty of $150,000 on the defendant, although the Commission had suggested a penalty of 
up to $250.000.43 
(b) Injunctions 
The High Court may also grant an injunction for contraventions of Part II, ID and 
IV of the Act to restrain a person from (further) engaging in the prohibited conduct.44 
Pursuant to section 88 of the Act, the Court has a wide discretion for its decision. For 
example, if the Court is satisfied that a person has engaged in the said conduct it may 
grant an injunction even if it considers that the person does not intend to engage again in 
the offending conduct and there is no imminent danger of substantial damage. 
The High Court may also grant an interim injunction pending the determination of 
an application for an injunction, if it deems it to be desirable.45 Such interim injunctions 
aim to temporarily restrain the defendant form doing something that will cause people 
3 Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd ( 1995) 6 TCLR 406, 568-9 (HC) McGechan J. 
39 Commerce Conunission v Taylor Preston lilnited & Ors (No.2) (1998) ZBLC 102,598-599 (HC). 
4° Commerce Commission v Eli Lilly and Co. (New Zealand) Lrd (30 April 1999) High Court Auckland 
CL 19/98, 5 ($500,000 and $200,000); Commerce Commission v Ca/tex New Zealand Ltd (2000) 9 
TCLR 366, 368-9 ($450,000, $375 ,000 and $350,000); Commerce Commission v Carter Holt llarvey 
Building Products Croup Ltd (2000) 9 TCLR 636, 649 ($525,000). 
41 Commerce Commission (CC) v Gil trap City Ltd (2002) l O TCLR 305 (HC). 
42 CC v Ciltrap , above, 314. 
43 CC v Ciltrap , above. 306, 319. 
44 Commerce Act 1986, ss 81, 84, 87 . 
45 Commerce Act 1986, s 88(2)(b) and (3 )(b) 
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damage for which they cannot be compensated at the full hearing. As an exemption by 
law, section 88A(l) of the Act orovides that the Court cannot require the Commission to 
give an undertaking as to damages if the Commission applies for an interim injunction. 
This is because the Commission, as a public enforcement body, is deemed to have "as 
little as no incentive to behave opportunistically".46 Finally, when considering the grant-
ing of an interim injunction, the Courts must give weight to the public interest.47 
(c) Divestiture orders 
Section 47 of the Act provides that the acquisition of a business, which would, or 
would be likely to, substantially lessen competition in a market, is prohibited. In the 
event of a contravention of section 47 the Court may order the disposal of assets or 
shares of the contravening parties.48 It can detennine the way of the divestiture either by 
its own discretion or in accordance with an undertaking given by the contravening party 
to the Commission under section 69A of the Act. Since the substitution of section 85 in 
1991, divestiture is no longer limited to those shares and assets acquired in the merger.49 
In fact, the Court now may order divestiture of any shares or assets belonging to any 
party of an illegal merger.so The remedy of divestiture is available for contraventions of 
section 47 only. The Courts cannot order the divestiture of assets or shares to overcome 
the effects of practice of other anti-competitive acts like, for example, restrictive trade 
practices pursuant to Part II of the Act.s1 
46 Commerce Conmlission, see Brooker 's Gault on Commercial law (Brookers, Wellington, 1994, 
Commerce Act 1986) vol I , CA88.08, 302 (last updated in 13 March 2003 ); Ian Millard "Penalties 
and Remedies" in Mark Berry & Lewis T Evans (eds) Competition Law at the Turn of the Centwy-
A New Zealand Perspective (Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2003) 194,2 10. 
47 Commerce Act l 986, s 88(3A), inserted by Commerce Amendment Act 200 I , s 22. 
48 Commerce Act 1986, s 85. 
49 Section 85 was substituted, as from I January l 991, bys 32 Commerce Amendment Act 1990 ( 1990 
No 41). 
50 Brooker ·s Gault on Commercial Law (Brookers, Wellington, 1994, Commerce Act l 986) vol I, 
CA85.04 (last updated 13 March 2003). 
51 Brooker ·s Gault on Commercial Law, above, CA85.04 . 
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(d) Criminal prosecution 
New Zealand does not criminalize offences under the Commerce Act 1986. 
52 Thus, 
the Commerce Commission can take criminal action only in relation to offences under 
the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
4 Private enforcement 
In New Zealand, the private right of action in competition matters was first intro-
duced by the Commerce Act 1986. Under the Trade Practices Act 1958 as well as under 
the Commerce Act 1975, enforcement of competition law had been reserved to adminis-
trative officials and the Courts.53 One reason for the introduction of private remedies 
was to utilise the potential "insider" knowledge of competitors and suppliers to alleged 
contraveners that presumably would facilitate detection and prosecution of anti-
competitive conduct. 54 Another consideration was to avoid solely relying on a public 
enforcement agency, which might be constrained by budget restraints. 55 Under the Act, 
private actions are generally available for contraventions of Part II, III and IV of the Act. 
Accordingly, private parties may file an action addressing anticompetitive conduct like 
arrangements that substantially lessen competition, group boycotts, price fixing, and 
contraventions of the merger provisions. However, from the limited data available on 
private competition law claims it seems that private actions have dealt primarily with 
allegations of abuse of dominant position in contravention of the old section 36 of the 
Act.s6 
(a) Standing to sue 
The Act provides for open standing to sue for injunctive relief. Sections 81 and 84 
provide that the Court may "on the application of the Commission or any other person" 
52 Under s 23C of the Trade Practices Act 1958 and s 58 of the Commerce Act 1975, restrictive trade 
practices contraventions had been enforceable by criminal proceedings. 
53 Rex J Ahdar "Antitrust Policy in ew Zealand: The Beginning of a ew Era" ( 1992) 9 International 
Tax and Business Lawyer 329, 334, who calls this regime a "c umbersome, bureaucratic system". 
54 Bernard M Hill & Mark R Jones Competitive Trading in New Zealand: The Commerce Act 1986 (But-
terworths, Wellington, 1986) 159. 
55 NZ Ministry of Commerce Penalties. remedies and court processes under Th e Commerce Act I 986: A 
discussion doc11111 enr (Wellington, January 1998) 32 <l!.UJL.. W\\ \\ .mt:__d.gm l.11/ hyslL 
bus_pol pennlt1t:~.pdt> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
56 Z Ministry of Commerce, above, 31. 
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grant an injunction. Applicants do not have to claim that they were injured by the al-
leged contravention or have a special interest in the application. Therefore, public inter-
est groups, consumer groups and trade associations theoretically qualify as potential 
plaintiffs. Damage claims, in contrast, require the plaintiff to establish a causal connec-
tion between anti-competitive conduct in question and the alleged damages or losses.57 
According to sections 82 and 84A of the Act, only those may bring an action for dam-
ages, whose loss or damage was "caused" by the alleged contravention.58 New Zea-
land's Courts do not appear to have developed any criteria to further specify this 
causation requirement. 
(b) Remedies 
In general, private parties can choose between the remedies of injunctive relief and 
damages for contravention of the above provisions. Private plaintiffs cannot obtain di-
vestiture orders in merger cases. Section 85(1) of the Act only refers to "applications of 
the Commission" for issuing such an order. 
(i) Injunctions 
According to sections 81 and 84 of the Act, private parties can obtain injunctive re-
lief from contraventions of Parts II and ill of the Act. Under section 88(2)(b) of the Act, 
the court may also grant interim injunctions "[i]f in the opinion of the [ c ]ourt it is desir-
able to do so" and regardless of whether it appears to the Court that the target of the 
interim injunction "intends to engage again, or to continue to engage" in the alleged 
misconduct. 
So far, most of the key enforcement decisions under the Commerce Act have been 
made in private actions for injunction.59 However, the discussion preceding the Com-
merce Act amendment in 2001 revealed that especially interim injunctions, until then, 
had failed to achieve sufficient deterrence and that litigation under the Commerce Act in 
57 It could be argued that the requirement to prove a causal connection is not an element of the standing 
requirement. 
58 See also s 89( I), which empowers the court to order, inter alia, the payment of damages in an action 
for an injunction. Before making such an order, however, the court must find " that a person who is a 
party to the proceedings has suffered, or is likely to suffer loss or damage by conduct ... in contraven-
tion of any of the provisions of Part l [ of this Act." 
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general was associated with high cost and delay.60 These considerations led to the intro-
duction of cease and desist orders to be made by the Commerce Commission under the 
new sections 74A-D of the Act. The Commerce Committee stated that "cease and desist 
orders would be an administrative injunction to terminate conduct that is, prima facie, in 
breach of the Act."61 It, therefore, remains to be seen whether private actions for injunc-
tions will continue to contribute to New Zealand's competition jurisprudence as they 
have done in the past. It is not unlikely that private parties will attempt to minimise cost 
and delay by seeking to induce the Commerce Commission to commence proceedings 
for cease and desist orders before making application for injunctive relief in court. The 
future may become clearer once the Commerce Commission has developed its approach 
to cease and desist orders. 62 
(ii) Damages 
Under sections 82 and 84A of the Act, private parties may claim damages for any 
loss or damage caused by a contravention of the provisions relating to restrictive trade 
practices and business acquisitions. As it becomes clear from the discussion preceding 
the Commerce Act amendment in 2001, the role of damages under the Act is not just to 
compensate plaintiffs for their losses but also to deter anticompetitive conduct. 63 The 
rationale behind this approach is the notion that, ultimately, it is the general public who 
suffers from anti-competitive conduct rather that just the individual competitor. 64
 More-
over, compensation for anti-competitive conduct by awarding purely compensatory 
damage is often deficient, because it can be hard to identify the number of customers 
59 See NZ Ministry of Conm1erce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act 
I 986: A discussion document (Wellington, January 1998) 57, Appendix 4, for a list of cases. 
60 In 1996, the Ministry of Commerce estimated that, on average, it took 121.4 weeks for a Commerce 
Act case to be litigated in the High Court , see Review of penalties. remedies and court processes un-
der the Commerce Act J 986 - Paper 4: Improving Court Processes (Wellington, 1999) 1. 
61 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial law (Brookers, Wellington, 1994, Commerce Act 1986) vo l 1, 
CA74A.04 (last updated 24 June 2003). 
62 See Z Commerce Commission Regulato,y Control and Enforcement Activities of the Commerce 
Commission 200 I /2002 (Wellington, 2002) 8 <h ttr.: \\ w,~ .c_9mcQJ11.!!.0\ l.nL' about document<. Rc!!ula-
to ry'tu20('ont ro t<~u20a nd%2 0 l:n forcemcnt''-.,20 Act i ,. 1 tics'\,2 Oo 11!-',12 Ot he%2QC. ~ornme rcc 'Yt~20Cornm I ss 10 
11° 0202001-2Q_Q2. )elf> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
63 NZ Min is try of Commerce Penalties. remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act 1986: A 
discussion document (Wellington, January 1998) 32: "The main issue that we consider ... is whether 
the role of damages under competition law is to compensate or deter or both. We conclude that there is 
a deterrence role and that the cuITent approach to damage awards does not achieve the deteITence ob-
Jective." 
Z Ministry of Commerce, above, 7-9. 
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hanned who even may have passed on some of the damage for example by subsequently 
on-selling an overpriced product. 65 
Although the Commerce Act has been 111 force for over 17 years now, damages 
have been sought in only a small number of cases and only in one case the Court held 
that the plaintiff was entitled to, though unspecified, damages.66 It seems that plaintiffs 
have difficulties in proving the causal connection required by sections 82 and 84A of the 
Act. In Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd, for example, the plaintiffs sought 
orders for damages for loss suffered as a result of the inability to load or unload a vessel 
arising out of the defendant's alleged anti-competitive conduct. 67 Although the High 
Court held that the conduct was illegal, it also concluded that the plaintiffs had been 
unable to establish a sufficient nexus between any loss suffered by them to entertain the 
claim for damages.68 In another case, Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications Ltd, the High Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council found 
that Telecom was in breach of section 36 of the Act by refusing to supply its Direct Dial 
In (DDI) facilities to Clear for interconnection with the network.69 However, all three 
courts dismissed Clear's claim for damages on the grounds that Clear had suffered no 
remediable loss because it was unlikely that Clear would have accepted even a reason-
able offer by Telecom for interconnection to the network.70 
It, therefore, seems highly questionable whether the remedy of damages has 
achieved the intended degree of deterrence so far. 71 Its contribution to competition ju-
risprndence in New Zealand has been, by all means, negligible. 
65 Z Ministry of Commerce, above, 32-33. 
66 In Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom Corp of New Zealand Ltd ( 1992) 5 TCLR 166, 219, 220, the 
High Court held that the plaintiff (Clear) was entitled to damages flowing from a breach of section 36 
of the Act. However, it suggested that they could be absorbed by the negotiated terms of interconnec-
tion. On appeal, Clear ' s entitlement to damages was confirmed but due to the special circumstances of 
the case, no specific amount of damages could be awarded, see Clear Communications Ltd v Telecom 
Corp of New Zealand Ltd ( 1993) 5 TCLR 413 , 438. 
67 Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd [ 1990] 2 NZLR 662 . 
68 Union Shipping, above, 662 , 713 . 
69 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd [ 1995] I NZLR 385 (PC). 
70 Telecom v Clear, above, 385, 409. 
71 In 1998, the Ministry of Commerce concluded that the remedy of damages had failed to achieve the 
deterrence objective. othing much has changed since then. 
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(iii) Exemplary damages 
In order to fix the lack of deterrence pertaining to damages, Parliament decided to 
introduce exemplary damages into the Commerce Act in 2001. The idea was to give an 
unmistakable signal to the courts that damages claims should be considered as a deter-
rent available to private plaintiffs. 72 Initially, the Ministry had considered multiple dam-
ages as an option to achieve the deterrence objective but the idea was eventually rejected 
because multiple damages were thought to give too strong incentives to overlitigation.73 
As from May 2001, section 82A(l) of the Act allows the Court to order a person to pay 
exemplary damages for any breach of Part II of the Act, even though it has already im-
posed (or will impose) a pecuniary penalty for the same conduct. However, the Court 
must have regard to the amount of such a penalty when determining the amount of ex-
emplary damages to be awarded. 74 This rule was established to meet concerns about 
possible double jeopardy.75 
(iv) Analysis 
To date, New Zealand Courts have not yet exercised their discretion to award ex-
emplary damages. It, therefore, remains to be seen if exemplary damages will achieve 
the deterrence objective as intended. The expectations are, however, low.76 Several fac-
tors suggest a rather pessimistic view. 
First of all, it could be derived from the Ministerial discussion document that 
Courts have already under-utilised their powers relating to compensatory damages.77 
There is no obvious reason why the mere availability of exemplary damages should re-
verse this trend. 
72 Z Cabinet Economic Committee Review of the Penalties, Remedies and Court Processes Under the 
Commerce Act I 986 - Paper 3: Reforming Remedies (Wellington, December 1998) para 21 . 
73 NZ Ministry of Commerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act I 986: A 
discussion document (Wellington, January 1998) 36-8. 
74 Commerce Act 1986, s 82A(2). 
75 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law (Brookers, Wellington, 1994, Commerce Act 1986) vol. I , 3-
294, CA82A.04 (last updated 24 June 2003). 
76 Jill Mallon & Jeru1y Stevens "Commerce Act Penalties for Individuals" (200 I) ZLJ 339, 341; Jan 
Millard "Penalties and Remedies" in Mark N Beny & Lewis T Evans (eds) Competition Law at the 
Turn of the Centwy - A New Zealand Perspective (Victoria niversity Press, Wellington, 2003) 194, 
208-9. 
77 Z Ministry of Commerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act I 986: A 
discussion document (Wellington, January 1998) 36. 
Competition Law Enforcement - Further Reform Options for New Zealand 22 
Secondly, as cases like Union Shipping v Port Nelson and Telecom v Clear indicate, 
the reason for the lack of successful damage claims appears to be the difficulties private 
plaintiffs have in proving both damages as well as a causal connection between the al-
leged anti-competitive conduct and the damages. 78 These difficulties and the costs and 
delay usually associated with Commerce Act litigation make settlements in potential 
(exemplary) damage cases a more reasonable alternative to litigation.79 
Third, the judicial threshold for the award of exemplary damages in other areas of 
law such as tort, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty seems to be quite high. In 
Ellison v L, the Court of Appeal recently stated in regard to a claim in tort for personal 
111JUry: 
"Exemplary damages are awarded to punish a defendant for high-handed disregard 
of the rights of a plaintiff or for acting in bad faith or for abusing a public position or 
behaving in some other outrageous manner which infringes the rights of the plaintiff. 
... We said in Cable v Robertson at p 15: 
New Zealand Courts are conservative in their approach to exemplary damages, re-
serving them for cases of truly outrageous conduct, which cannot be adequately pun-
ished in any other way. They are awarded only in serious and exceptional cases. "
80 
Consequently, if exemplary damages are to be granted only in cases of the worst 
offending, there is likelihood that the Commerce Commission will step in anyway and 
seek action for a pecuniary penalty. In this case, Mallon and Stevens consider the 
chances to obtain exemplary damages as "minimal if not non-existent."81 
Furthermore, awards of exemplary damages in other commerce-related areas of law 
have been rather low. In Cook v Evatt for example, Fisher J, having found a breach of a 
fiduciary duty, awarded exemplary damages of only $5,000 compared to compensatory 
damages of $22,000 (which was, in effect, the profit wrongfully made on the transac-
78 See also Jill Mallon & Jenny Stevens, above, 341. 
79 Mallon and Stevens speculate that exemplary damages might have ITtinimal practical impact as a threat 
in settlement negotiations . 
80 Ellison v l [ 1998] I ZLR 416, 419 (CA). 
8 1 Jill Mallon & Jenny Stevens "Commerce Act Penalties for Indiv1duals" (2001) ZLJ 339,342. 
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tion) .82 Other cases comprise Harding v Kummer ($5 ,000 for a conspiracy to rig an auc-
tion) and Witten Hannah v DaviPs ($ l 0,000 for breach of a fiduciary duty). 83 
Finally, as already adumbrated, it is also the structure of section 82A of the Act that 
renders it unlikely that exemplary damages will achieve the envisaged deterrence or 
pose a sufficient incentive to sue. First, it is to the Court ' s discretion to award exem-
plary damages at all, and if so, to detennine the amount of such damages.84 In the ab-
sence of an automatic trigger for exemplary damages, parties are left uncertain as to 
whether or not the Court will actually grant exemplary damages. Secondly, the Court 
must consider any pecuniary penalty already been imposed for the same conduct when 
determining the amount of the exemplary damages.85 This further reduces the incentive 
to sue in cases where a pecuniary penalty has already been imposed or is likely to be 
imposed. 
To conclude, the private right of action in New Zealand has contributed to the anti-
trust jurisprudence primarily through private actions injunctions, but has, so far, fail ed 
as an instrument to achieve sufficient deterrence through private damage actions. 
82 Cook v Eva // [ l 992] I ZLR 676. 
83 Harding v Kummer (2 l March l 983) High Court Auck land A l 107-80, Casey J; Witren Hannah v 
Davies [ 1995 ] 2 ZLR 14 1. 
84 Sec tion 82A( l ) reads : "The Court may order a person ... to pay exemplary damages . .. " 
5 Commerce Ac t 1986, s 82A(2) . 
Competition Law Enforcement - Further Refo1m Options for ew Zealand 24 
B Germany 
The relevant German competition law is set out in the Act against Restraints of 
Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen, "GWB"), which protects the 
existence of competition in Germany against all forms of restrictions. 86 Contraventions 
of the GWB are framed as administrative offences. Thus, complementary enforcement 
legislation comprises the German Administrative Offences Act (Gesetz iiber Ord-
nungswidrigkeiten, "OWiG"), the German Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, "StGB") and 
the Code of Criminal Procedure (StrafprozejJordnung, "StPO"). 
1 Public enforcement bodies 
Competition law enforcement on a federal level is primarily in the hands of the 
Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt - "the Office"). In exceptional cases, the Fed-
eral Ministry of Economics and Labour Ministry (Bundesministerium fuer Wirtschafl 
und Arbeit) may, on application, authorise cartels or mergers otherwise prohibited if 
they are deemed necessary on public interest grounds. 87 The State Cartel Offices (Lan-
deskartellcimter) are the Office's counterparts at a state level. They are competent to 
deal with restraints on competition only if the influence on competition does not extend 
beyond the territory of the State (Bundesfand). 88 
(a) The Federal Cartel Office 
The Federal Cartel Office is an independent federal agency. Its main task is to apply 
and enforce the provisions of the GWB. The Office proceeds against all restraints of 
competition, which have an effect within Germany, but is not concerned with unfair 
trade practises.89 The Office comprises of 11 Decision Divisions, which decide on all 
administrative and administrative fine cases. A Division consists of a chairperson and 
86 For an official English translation of the GWB see <ht tp: \YW\,\.QUl1_L_il'\l-.artellamt.g<.: C1W!JOl-
iQQ2.pdt> (last accessed 7 October 2003); Bundeskartellamt The Tasks of the Bundeskartellamt - An 
Overview (Bundeskartellamt, B01U1, 2002) 2 <http: ,n, \\ .h!lntlt,!~kartt:llamt.dc £3roschun:_ t:ngl 
.Jan02.pdf> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
87 Sections 8, 42 GWB. 
88 Sections 4 (2) GWB. 
89 The relevant law here, the UWG, is enforced by private parties. 
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two other members who must reach a majority decision . Each Division is responsible 
for activities in a pa1iicular prorluct and service market. For example, the 3rd Division 
deals with the chemical products branch while the 7th Division is mainly concerned 
with electrical engineering products.90 The ultimate head of authority is the President of 
the Federal Cartel Office. The Decision Divisions decide independently on the cases and 
on competitive criteria alone.91 They do not receive instructions from any internal bod-
ies (for instance the President) or external authorities . Although being responsible to the 
Ministry of Economics and Labour92 the Federal Cartel Office does not receive instruc-
tions from it. Located in Bonn, the Office has a staff of about 270, 50 per cent of which 
are senior civil servants appointed for life and holding degrees in law or economics.93 
The current annual budget of the Office accounts for about EUR 16 million (approxi-
mately NZ$ 31.5 million) .94 
(b) The courts 
In terms of competition enforcement, German courts are primarily responsible for 
judicial review. Individuals or undertakings may fil e an appeal with the Court of Appeal 
in Diisseldorf ( Oberlandesgericht "OLG" Diisseldorj) against decisions of the Federal 
Cartel Office. Decisions on appeals are rendered by a specialised cartel division, which 
is neither a civil nor criminal division but an independent panel of judges with special 
expert knowledge.95 Appeals on points of law against the decisions of the Court of Ap-
peal may be filed with the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshoj) . The ordinary 
courts decide private actions arising under the Act. 
9° For an Eng lish struc ture chart see < ht_lJ>.: \\\\'\\.QU11_1,leskartl'llamt.de Qr!.!ani,g_rammen •070:l.p_g_f> ( las t 
accessed 7 Oc tober 2003 ). 
9 1 Bundcskarte ll amt The Tasks of th e Bu11deskar1e/lam1 - An Overview (B undeskarte ll amt, Bonn, 2002) 
4 <http . w,,\, .pu ndeskartcllamt.de. Brcv,chur e_c ngJ . .lan02 .12Q f> ( las t accessed 7 Oc tober 2003). 
92 Sec ti on 5 1 ( I )( l ) GWB. 
93 B undeskarte ll amt The Tasks of th e Bu11deskarrella1111 - An Overview. Above, 9. 
94 ee <htl[! . "\\ \\ hu ngeskartcllamt.dc _l)umksLu tclla1111.html ( las t accessed 7 Oc tober 2003 ). 
95 Fo r a struc ture chart see <http : W\\ \\ .olg-dul's,l'idorl.nr\, .de. 111dc'\ .ht111> ( las t accessed 7 Oc tober 
2003). 
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2 Administrative enforcement by the Federal Cartel Office 
The GWB vests the Office with far-reaching enforcement powers. Its competences 
comprise the investigation and determination of a contravention as well as the power to 
impose administrative fines or to issue cease and desist orders. 
(a) Administrative cease and desist orders 
The Office may prohibit any conduct, which is in contravention of the provisions of 
the GWB, by way of an administrative order pursuant to section 32 GWB.96 Section 34 
GWB provides for excess proceeds surcharge orders. If an undertaking or person, as a 
result of a conduct prohibited by the Office, has obtained additional proceeds following 
service of the prohibiting decision, the Office may order the undertaking to pay to it "an 
amount equivalent to such additional proceeds (skimming-off additional proceeds)."
97 
The Office may estimate the amount of such additional proceeds. 
(b) Administrative fines 
The predominant sanction for anti-competitive behaviour in Gem1any is the imposi-
tion of an administrative fine. The Office may impose such fines on persons or under-
takings committing infringements of the GWB or decisions of the Office pursuant to 
section 81 GWB. This section provides that whoever intentionally or negligently vio-
lates one of the substantive GWB provisions referred to in section 81(1), commits an 
administrative offence. Section 81 (2) GWB distinguishes between severe administrative 
offences and minor offences. Severe administrative offences are listed in section 81 (2) 
GWB and comprise contraventions of substantive law prohibitions like the prohibition 
of cartels and the abuse a market-dominating position. 98 Such serious offences may be 
punished by a fine of up to EUR 500,000, and in excess of this amount up to three times 
the additional proceeds obtained as a result of the violation. Contraventions not listed in 
section 81 (2) GWB constitute only minor offences. Such cases concern the protection of 
official information duties as well as reporting duties; a minor offence is, for example, 
96 Section 32 GWB reads: "Prohibition The cartel authority may prohibit conduct by undertakings and 
associations of undertakings which is in contravention of this Act." 
97 According to s 34( 1) GWB, this rule does not apply insofar a such additional proceeds have been 
balanced by payments of damages or by an administrative fine. 
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the failure to notify the Office after having put a concentration into effect.99 For minor 
offences the Office may impose a fine up to EUR 25,000. 
The Office may impose a fine on "whoever" wilfully or negligently contravenes a 
prohibition or order referred to in section 81 GWB. This affects private individuals as 
well as unde1iakings. If an undertaking is a legal entity (Juristische Person), it can be 
held liable for an offence committed by its organs and representatives. According to 
section 30 OWiG, such an offence will be deemed the offence of the association, if the 
offence infringes a company-related duty of the association, or if the association is en-
riched and this enrichment was intended. Company-related duties include guarantor ob-
ligations and duties of care towards third parties in trade, and, in particular, the duty of 
the proprietor of the undertaking to supervise pursuant to section 130 OWiG.
100 Since 
the breach of supervisory duties can consist in faulty organisation, the Office can impose 
an administrative fine if the duty to supervise has been breached but is not possible to 
identify the person who actually committed the breach. 101 
The basic factors in setting the amount of the fine are the significance of the 
administrative offence and the charge levelled at the offender. 102 Section 17(2) OWiG 
further provides that a fine imposed for negligent infringement may only amount up to 
half of the maximum amounts set out in section 81 (2) GWB. Apart from these general 
rules, German law does not provide any sentencing guidelines as to how to dete1mine 
the amount of a fine. 103 However, the Office ' s and Courts ' practice has established sev-
eral factors that must be taken into account, which are quite similar to the factors 
adopted by New Zealand courts. These factors relate to the nature, gravity and duration 
of the infringement. Some of them are: 
98 Section 81(1 ) no.I GWB, referring, inter alia, to ss I , 19 GWB. 
99 Sections 81(1) no. 4, 39(6) GWB. 
100 See Jorg Biermann "Report" to be published in Gerhard Dannecker / Oswald Jansen (eds) Competition 
Law Sanctioning in the European Union: The EU-law Influence on National Competition Law Sanc-
tioning (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands, forthcoming 2003) 12 , 13 <11.!.!.P: 
cngli §.h.JlQC.or.id,datanndoncs1cn l_ant1tru§.t Jerman.doc> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
101 Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) (8 February 1994) KRB 25/93 WuW/E BGJ-l 2904 and StZ 1994, 346 
Unrernehmenssubmission <htt11: \\ \\ \\ .rccht-find .de b!!h) ()Q\.\ ig.htm> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
102 Section 17(3) OWiG. 
103 Only the Office's guidelines for it ' le111ency programme' set out some mitiga ting factors , see Bundes-
kartellamt Bekanntmachung Nr. 68/2000 iiber Richt/inien des Bundeskartellamtes fiir die Festsetzung 
von Celdbu/Jen - Bonusregelung (Bonn, Germany, April 2000) <http: \\ W\\ .bum_k s_kart c_llamt. 
de Bonu~r~c~f'> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
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• The way in which the offence was carried out, for example, the application of 
confidentiality measures when putting plans restricting competition into effect; 104 
• The motives and aims of the offender, for example, whether the offender was 
· f · 105 actmg out o necessity or emergency; 
• Whether the infringement affected the whole national market or or a market of 
considerable economic importance and scale; 106 
• Whether an infringement constitutes a purely administrative irregularity; 107 
• The duration of the offence as well as the frequency of similar contraventions 
are also important considerations; 108 
• Whether the offender has cooperated with the Office to uncover anti-
competitive conduct. 109 
( c) Procedure of administrative decision-making 
The procedure of administrative decision-making is governed by sections 57 et seq 
GWB, while penalty proceedings are specifically regulated by the OWiG. The Office 
may use information and documents obtained during the investigation under section 59 
GWB in subsequent penalty proceedings provided that the administrative proceedings 
were carried out properly, that means in particular that advice was given concerning the 
right to non-disclosure under to section 59(5) GWB. 
According to section 47(1) OWiG, the prosecution and punishment of anti-
competitive offences and, thus, the institution of proceedings for administrative fines 
lies within the proper discretion of the cartel authority and is subject to considerations of 
104 KG Berlin ( 14 January 1972) Zahnpasten WuWIE OLG 1265, 1268. 
105 See Biem1ann, above, 20, fn. 19 for further reference . 
106 KG Berlin (6 June 1984) WuW/E OLG 3175, 3180 Preisanpass1111gsk!a11sel; BKartA (16 February 
1982) WuW/E BKartA 2005, 2007 Behii!terg!as; KG Berlin (11 September 1998) WuW/E DE-R 228, 
232 Osthafen111iiMe. 
107 BKartA (28 December 1971) WuW/ E BKartA 1376, 1387 Linoleum. 
108 BGH (29 April 1991) WuW/E BGI! 2718, 2720 811/Jge!dbemessung; KG Berlin (2 September 1974) 
WuW/E OLG 1569, 1570 Tierpflegemitte!. 
109 See Bundeska11ellamt Beka1111t111ach1111g Nr. 68/2000 iiber Richt!inie11 des Bundeskarte!!amtes fiir die 
Festsetzung von Ce!dbu/Jen - Bonusrege!ung (Bonn, Germany, April 2000) <http : W\\ ,\ .l:>undcs kar-
tellaml.dl' !Jont_1sre!!dt11Jg.pdf> (last accessed 7 October 2003 ). 
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expedience. 110 The Office can confine itself to prosecuting individual offences taking 
into account objective go2ls and the gravity of the contravention. In an unclear state of 
affairs, the authority can set the estimated costs of investigation in relation to the ex-
pected result of the investigation. 111 
In an administrative fine proceeding, a range of statutory provisions, which are to 
guarantee a fair trial, protects the accused. Once, the Office has instituted proceedings 
against a person for a contravention of competition law, it must inform the accused of 
his right to remain silent pursuant to section 136 StP0. 112 Any accused is given oppor-
tunity to comment on the accusation. 113 He or she has the right to make a statement be-
fore the closing of investigations at the latest. 114 Counsel for the defence is entitled to 
inspect the files, provided that the Office has noted the termination of investigations in 
the file. 115 The Office must inform counsel as soon as the right to inspect files exists 
without restriction. Counsel enjoys legal privilege; oral and written communication 
between the accused and counsel may neither be restricted nor be subject to seizure. 116 If 
the Office decides to impose an administrative fine, it issues a penalty notice, which is 
send to the accused and which the Office may enforce pursuant to sections 90(1), 92 
OWiG. 
( d) Legal remedies against sanctions - Right to appeal 
The offender may file an objection against a penalty notice with the Office within 
two weeks after service of the notice pursuant to section 67 OWiG. If the Office does 
not revoke the penalty notice, the file is forwarded to the cartel division of the Court of 
Appeal in Dilsseldorf. 11 7 The cartel division normally decides on such objection at a full 
trial. The penalty notice forms the basis of the trial. The Court, however, may order fur-
ther investigation of the matter according to section 71(2) no 1 OWiG. Because of its 
11 0 Gerhard Dannecker & Ji:irg Biermann in Ulrich Immenga & Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker CWB Cesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrii11kunge11 - Kommentar (3 ed, Cl I Beck, Mlinchen, Germany, 200 l) pream-
ble to section 81 paras 148 et seq. 
111 Erich Gohler ( ed) Cesetz iiber Ordnungswidrigkeiten Kur:kommentar ( 13 ed, Cil Beck, Mlinchen, 
Germany, 2002) section 47 paras 3 et seq. 
11 2 Gohler Cesetz iiber Ord11u11gs1vidrigkeite11 - Kurzkommenrar, above, section 55 para 8 with details. 
113 Section 56(1) GWB. 
114 Section 46 OWiG in connection with s 163( l) StPO. 
115 Section 46 OWiG in connection with s 147 StPO. 
116 Sections 97, 148(1) StPO. 
11 7 The OLG Dlisseldorf has jurisdiction on penalties matters pursuant to section 83 GWB. 
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special expertise, the Office may respond to the appeal and has the right to attend the 
trial. 118 The judgment is r1ade independently of the penalty notice, and will either ac-
quit, convict or suspend proceedings. 119 The Court may also increase the sanction origi-
nally imposed by the penalty notice. 120 Appeals against judgments of the cartel division 
of the OLG may only be made on points of law pursuant to section 79(1) OwiG to the 
Federal Court of Justice, which has exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to section 84 GWB. 
(e) Efficiency and deterrence of fine proceedings 
Statistical data on the speed and accuracy of the Office's administrative fine pro-
ceedings is rare. However, there are some indications as to the efficiency of the adminis-
trative process. According to its Activity Report for 2001/2002, the Office commenced 
cartel proceedings against firms in the ready-made concrete sector, which resulted in the 
imposition of fines amounting to a total of EUR 1.6 million and EUR 2.7 million. 121 
The respective penalty notices became final binding in less than a year. In May 1998, 
the Office carried out a nation-wide search of road signs manufacturers and subse-
quently imposed fines totalling DM 3.7 million against 10 undertakings and 14 indi-
viduals, which became final in less than 8 months. 122 These sample figures show that 
the Office is able to conduct complex investigations and subsequently impose signifi-
cant fines without major delay and, apparently, without legal fault. All penalty notices in 
the cases above became legally binding, that means no (successful) appeals were filed 
against them. 
In terms of amounts of fines, one can fairly safely assume that administrative fines 
grant significant deterrence. The Office does not hesitate to conduct nation-wide inves-
tigations and subsequently impose large fines on offenders, which it has frequently done 
in the past. In 1999 and 2000 the Office detected a State-spanning price and quota cartel 
between firms in the ready-mixed concrete sector, which operated over several years. By 
118 Gehler Gesetz iiber Ordnu11gswidrigkeire11 - Kur:::ko111111e11tar, above, section 76. 
119 Sections 46(1), 71(1) OWiG, 411(4) StPO. 
12° Compare ss 71, 72(3)(2) OWiG. 
121 Bundeskartellamt Ti.itigkeitsbericht des Bundeskarrellamtes 200//2002 (Deutscher Bundestag, Druck-
sache 15/1226, Bonn, Germany, 27 June 2003) 147 <htt ): cl1n_._buntl<:slal!.Q<.::. ,btcl 
15 () 12_ I :~ () 1226.pdf> (last accessed 7 October 2003 ). 
112 Bundeskartellamt Ti.itigkei1shericht des Bundeskartel/amte · 1997/1998 (Deutscher Bundestag, Druck-
sache 14/ 1139, Bonn, Germany, 25 June 1999) 34 <http d1p.bundl'~IBg,debtd 14 011 14011 39.Qdf> 
(last accessed 7 October 2003). 
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virtue of the evidence seized during the investigation, the Office was able to impose 
administrative fines amou11ting to a total of around DM 370 million on 69 firms and on 
51 managing directors. 123 Most of the fines became legally binding very quickly because 
the firms did not deny the allegations. 124 In April 2003, the Office imposed even larger, 
and up to now, record fines totalling approximately EUR 660 million in cartel proceed-
ings against the six largest German cement manufacturers. 125 In both cases, the Office 
applied the surcharge rule of section 81 (2) GWB to determine such massive fines. 
3 Criminal enforcement 
The GWB does not provide for criminal sanctions. However, a violation of compe-
tition law may constitute a criminal act subject to criminal prosecution under the Ger-
man Criminal Code. The only criminal sanction specifically concerning competition is 
for bid rigging pursuant to section 298 StGB, which may be punished by imprisonment 
up to five years or imposition of a fine. Anti-competitive conduct may also constitute 
general offences such as fraud, coercion or extortion. In practice, however, German 
competition law enforcement largely relies on the deterrence achieved by administrative 
fines. So far, there is hardly any case law on section 298 StGB. 126 Reasons for this are 
presumably the narrow focus of section 298 StGB and the fact that it is a relatively new 
prov1s1on. 127 
123 Bundeskartellamt Activity Report I 999/2000 - Short version (Bundeskartellamt, Bonn, Germany, 
2001) <h~\\'\nv.l:lun<l~kartellamt.9.::, Ku17QrQ~c huere-BKartA-TB-l :ngli~h.Jldf> 29, 30 (last ac-
cessed 7 October 2003). 
124 Bundeskartellamt (3 ovember 1999) Press Release <hug: \\ \\ w.hungeskar_t_cllamt.de/OJ_J I_ 1999_ 
enolisch~html> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
125 Bundeskartellamt ( 14 April 2003) Pres Release <h ttp: \\W\\ .p~111~k1 knrtellamt.Je 14_0-L200J eng: 
l1sch.html> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
126 Jorg Biermann "Report" to be published in Gerhard Dannecker / Oswald Jansen (eds) Competition 
Law Sanctioning in the European Union: The EU-laH• Influence on National Competition Law Sanc-
tioning ( Kluwer Law International , The II ague, The etherlands, forthcoming 2003) 16 <hup: en , .. 
ltsh.plK-_DJ.1tl data 111dones1l!nl antilrus_J_J_crman.<loc> (la t accessed 7 October 2003). 
127 Section 298 StGB was introduced as part of the Act Combating Corruption which entered into force 
on 20 August 1997. 
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4 Private enforcement 
The GWB provides for private enforcement of competition law in section 33 
GWB. 128 According to this section, private actions are available for the violation of any 
provision of the GWB (or decision by a cartel authority), if the provision (or decision) in 
question is intended to protect the interests of the potential plaintiff. The actionable 
conduct comprises, inter alia, a contravention of the ban on cartels (section 1 GWB) 
and the abuse of a market-dominating position (section 19 GWB). According to the 
practice of the German courts, competitors to the parties of a cartel are protected by Sec-
tion 1 GWB in any case and have, therefore, standing to sue for injunctive relief or for 
damages if they are significantly affected by a cartel. 129 Suppliers and customers, how-
ever, will have to establish that the cartel in question aims at their individual detriment 
or hindrance. This could be the case, for instance, with respect to a customer who suf-
fers from a price cartel. 
Under section 33 GWB, private parties may sue for injunctive relief or claim contrac-
tual and tortuous damages for any loss or damage caused by a wilful or negligent contra-
vention of such provision. Since German law does not recognise "punitive damages", 
p1ivate parties can only claim compensatory damages for anti-competitive behaviour. 130 
Under sections 249 et seq. of the German Civil Law Code (Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch, 
"BGB"), such a claim for compensation is limited to restoring the state of affairs, which 
would have existed without the infringement. 131 
Much like criminal enforcement, the private right of action has not played a signifi-
cant role in competition law enforcement in Germany. In particular, the practical signifi-
cance of private damages claims in Germany has been low. 132 To date, German courts 
have not ordered cartel participants to pay a certain amount of damages. As a matter of 
fact, private actions for damages by companies as cartel victims hardly ever occur. A 
128 Section 33 GWB reads: "Liability for Damages; Claims for Injunctions - Whoever violates a provi-
sion of this Act or a decision taken by the cartel authority shall, if such provision or decision serves to 
protect another, be obliged vis-a-vis the other to refrain from s:ich conduct; if the violating party acted 
wilfully or negligently, it shall also be liable for the damages arising from the violation. The claim for 
injunction may also be asserted by associations for the promotion of trade interests provided the asso-
ciation has legal capacity." 
129 Volker Emmerich in Ulrich Immenga & Ernst-Joachim Mestmacker CWB Cesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
heschrtink1111ge11 Ko111111entar (3 cd, C.H. Beck, Mi.inchen, Germany, 200 l) section 33 paras 8 et seq 
130 Biermann, above, 15 . 
111 Emmerich in Ulrich Immenga & Em t-Joachim Mestmacker, above, sec tion 33 paras 45 et seq. 
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reason for this might be that cartels are extremely difficult to detect from the outside 
because they are usually concluded under highly conspiratorial circumstances. 133 In this 
regard, the prospect of mere compensation may not be enough to induce private parties 
to commence litigation. One impediment to private enforcement of the rules against 
abusive conduct of market-dominating enterprises has been the reluctance of adversely 
affected small firms to commence an action for fear of retaliatory measures taken by 
accused business partners. 134 This obstacle was removed by the 1999 Amendments to 
the Act. Now, the Office may institute proceeding ex officio upon the request of a com-
plainant in order to protect the claimant's anonymity. 135 
C United States 
The federal antitrust laws of the United States are enforced in several ways. Public 
enforcement authority is vested in two federal agencies, the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which exercise their authority 
through civil and criminal actions. The antitrnst laws give also standing to private par-
ties, who can bring lawsuits seeking treble damages and injunctions. Final decisions in 
tem1s of penalties, damages awards, injunctions and other orders are up to the federal 
courts. In the United States, the private antitrnst actions are "the principal mechanism, 
by which the antitrust laws are enforced." 136 Over the past 25 years, private actions have 
constituted in excess of 90 % of all antitrust cases filed in the United States. 
The relevant substantial antitrust law of the United States is set out in three major 
federal codes. The Shennan Act outlaws all acts that unreasonably restrain interstate and 
foreign trade or monopolise any part of interstate commerce. Sherman Act violations are 
punished as criminal felonies and can lead to criminal fines or the imprisonment of in-
dividuals. The Clayton Act is a civil statute carrying no criminal penalties. It prohibits 
132 Emmerich, above, section 33 para I . 
133 This was also on of the reasons for the Bundeskartellamt to launch its ·leniency programme' in April 
2000. This progranune provides incentives for cartel members to leave the cartel and to inform the Of-
fice via reduced fines for the infom1er, see <http: W\\ w.bundcska rtc ll aml.dc Bo nusrcoclun >-E. di> 
(last accessed 7 October 2003). 
134 Joachim Rudo "The 1999 Amendments to the German Act Against Restraints of Competition" (Berlin, 
Germany, 1999) <h1rp: w\n\ .a11t1tru st_.dc> (last accessed 7 October 2003) . 
135 Section 54( I)( I) GWB. 
136 Herbert 1-lovenkamp Federal A11titrusr Policy - The Law of Competition and Its Practice (West Pub-
lishing, St. Paul, M , nited States, 1994) 542. 
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mergers and acquisitions that are likely to lessen competition, and discriminating busi-
ness practices like price discrimination. 137 The Clayton Act also provides for the private 
right of action. The Federal Trade Commission Act prohibits unfair methods of compe-
tition in interstate commerce. It also created the Federal Trade Commission to police 
violations of the Act. Complementary procedural legislation comprises the Antitrust 
Procedures and Penalties Act (Tunney Act) and the Federal Administrative Procedure 
Act. 
1 Public enforcement bodies 
Public enforcement of the federal antitrust laws is largely in the hands of two fed-
eral enforcement agencies, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice of the 
United States and the Federal Trade Commission. The Antitrust Division has technically 
exclusive federal responsibility for enforcing the Sherman Act, and has joint authority 
with the Federal Trade Commission over enforcement of the Clayton Act. Since the 
jmisdiction of the two agencies overlaps, they have developed clearance procedures to 
notify each other before commencing investigations or filing actions to avoid duplica-
tive investigations and prosecutions. 138 
(a) The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
The Antitrnst Division ("the Division") is part of the executive branch of the gov-
ernment. Its location in the Department of Justice, rather than in a department more spe-
cifically charged with economic policy, follows from the Sherman Act's origins as a 
criminal statute. The Division has exclusive federal responsibility to enforce the crimi-
nal provisions of the federal antitrust laws. 139 The Division's main antitrust enforcement 
activity is the launching of investigations and, if necessary the subsequent pursuit of 
criminal or civil litigation. However, the Division also can (and often does) terminate 
civil antitrust investigations leading to litigation by reaching a settlement approved by 
the court ("consent decrees"). The Division cannot issue binding orders on its own au-
137 Section 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Amendment in 1936; section 2, 
therefore, is also referred to as the Robinson-Patman Act. 
138 Ernest Gellhorn & William E Kovacic (eds) Antitmst law and Economics (4 ed, We t Publishing, St. 
Paul, M , United States, 1994) 452. 
139 Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act, s 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, and s 14 of the Clayton Act. 
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thority, but must make its cases to the judges. The Antitrust Division is headed by the 
"Assistant Attorney General" who is nominated by the President and confim1ed by the 
Senate. 
(b) The Federal Trade Commission 
The Federal Trade Commission ("the Commission") is an independent regulatory 
agency, located politically between the legislature and the executive. The Commission 
has direct authority for civil enforcement of the Clayton Act. It also has the power to 
challenge "unfair methods of competition" under section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act. 14° Courts have interpreted this section to include all practices that violate 
the Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws, so the Commission has effectively the 
authority to enforce the substance of all of the antitrust laws. 141 The Commission con-
sists of five commissioners who are appointed by the President subject to Senate con-
firmation and serve seven-year terms. The Commission exercises its enforcement 
authority mainly through administrative adjudication, which take the form of an internal 
complaint procedure. Its remedial authority is limited to issuing cease and desist orders 
and assessing civil penalties for violations of such orders.
142 
2 Public enforcement 
Public remedies for violations of the antitrust laws include criminal penalties such 
as fines and jail sentences and civil remedies such as injunctions, cease and desist or-
ders. 
(a) Criminal prosecution - Fines and imprisonment 
The Antitrust Division may bring criminal prosecutions under the Sherman Act, 
which can lead to criminal fines or jail sentences. According to the Assistant Attorney 
General, R. Hewitt Pate, criminal antitrust enforcement is a "core priority" of the Anti-
140 15 SC Section 45(a)( I). 
141 Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy - The Law of Competition and Its Practice (West Pub-
lishing, St. Paul, M , United tales, 1994) 536. 
142 15 SC Section 45(1) & (m). 
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trust Division. 143 Under section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the Antitrust Division can 
seek (and the courts can impose) criminal fines of up to US$ 10 million for corporate 
offenders . If a greater fine is appropriate, the Division can invoke 18 USC Sec. 357l(d), 
a general provision governing the sentencing of criminal fines. 144 According to this sec-
tion, a corporate defendant may be fined twice the i !legal gross gain derived from the 
crime or twice the pecuniary loss caused to the victims. Under this provision the Divi-
sion was able to obtain record fines of US$ 500 million from Swiss F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche Ltd and US$ 225 million from German BASF AG in 1999 for their participation 
in a worldwide vitamin cartel. 145 The fines in these two cases as in almost all other ma-
jor criminal proceedings have, however, not been assessed by a court but have been ne-
gotiated between the offenders and the Division in either Plea or Sentencing 
Agreements. 146 Individual offenders may be fined up to US$ 350,000. In addition, 
courts can sentence individuals to up to 3 years in federal prison for each offence. In the 
last years there has been a trend towards increasing jail sentences, leading to a record of 
10,000 days of total jail time in the fiscal year 2001/02 with an average sentence of 
more than 18 months and jail terms imposed on high-profile executives.
147 
(b) Civil enforcement - Injunctions and consent decrees 
The Division may sue for an injunction under section 15 of the Clayton Act. 148 The 
obtainable relief includes forbidding orders as well as orders requiring positive acts to 
restore competition including the divestiture or discontinuance of parts of a business. 
143 R Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice) "Vigorous 
and Principled Antitrust Enforcement: Priorities and Goals" (Speech before the Antitrust Section of 
the American Bar Association on its Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, 12 August 2003) 
<htt ://v,rww .usdo · .<>ov 'atr ublic .:sgceches ·2012-l I .htm (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
144 18 USC Section 3571(d) reads: "Alternative Fine Based on Gain or Loss - If any person derives pecu-
niary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defen-
dant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross 
loss, unless imposition of a fine under this subsection would undul y complicate or prolong the sentenc-
ing process." 
145 Both companies agreed to plead guilty, see US Department of Justice (20 May 1999) Press Release 
<h!.!n.;_ \H\·w.usc.lo].!!.O\ iUtr 1211lllic 1rcs~ release~ 1999 2-150.ht,,1> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
146 A list of all recent She1man Act violations yielding a fin e of S$10 million or more is available at 
<hll :. ww,\ .usc.loj.gov 'alr ·1llihJ1c crn111nal I 2.~i7Ji 1111> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
147 Deborah Platt Majoras , Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, US Department of 
Justice "A Review of Recent Antitrust Divis ion Actions" ( pcech manuscript distributed at American 
Bar Association, Section of Business Law, 2003 Confe rence for Corporate Counsel, Washington, D.C. 
12 June 2003) <httn..:. \.\\\.\\.t1sdOJ.,fill\ ·atq1ul>lic spl'cchcs 201159.htm> (last accessed 7 October 
2003). 
148 15 USC Section 25 . 
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Under section 15 of the Clayton Act, the Court may also make a "temporary restraining 
order or prohibition" as it deems just. In contrast to private actions under section 16, the 
Division does not have to provide security or bond against damages for an improvi-
dently granted temporary order. Most of the civi I antitrust cases brought by the Division 
result in consent decrees, which are binding out-of-court settlements approved by the 
court. In this case, the issues raised in the action are not discussed in trial and no testi-
mony is taken. Consent decrees are attractive to defendants because, other than a final 
judgment, they do not constitute prima facie evidence against the defendant in any fol-
low-on treble damage action under section S(a) of the Clayton Act. 149 
(c) Cease and desist orders 
The Federal Trade Commission's main enforcement remedy is a cease and desist 
order. 150 The Commission can issue such orders without having to resort to the courts 
after a specific internal proceeding governed by the Federal Trade Commission Act 151 
and supplementary regulations. 152 Usually, the Commission receives inquiries and com-
plaints from customers and competitors about possible antitrust law violations. The 
Commission evaluates each inquiry or complaint, and where appropriate, makes a for-
mal complaint to the Administrative Law Judge, a Commission employee with some-
what protected tenure and status. 153 The defendant has thirty days to file an answer to 
the complaint. If the complaint is contested, the Administrative Law Judge conducts a 
hearing, which is similar to a trial and then issue a preliminary decision. During this 
process, the Commission's complaint counsel bears the burden of proof. The Commis-
sion can either approve or disapprove the preliminary decision. The Commission's 
cease and desist order from may be judicially reviewed by the Federal Court of Appeal. 
3 Private enforcement 
Private actions have been accessible under the United States antitrnst laws since the 
enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. The private right of action was initially estab-
149 15 USC Section 16 (Tunney Act) . 
150 See s 5(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U C Section 45(b ). 
15 1 15 SC Sections 41-5 8. 
152 16 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Chapter I. 
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lished in section 7 of this statute and was superseded by section 4 of the Clayton Act in 
1914.
154 Despite this long tradition of private antitrnst actions, Hovenkamp has pointed 
out that "neither Congress nor the courts has articulated a rationale for private enforce-
ment."155 He presumes that the purpose of private antitrnst enforcement is to maximise 
social wealth by deterring inefficient practices and permitting efficient ones. According 
to a OECD report on the role of competition policy in regulatory reform provided by the 
United States Government, private suits are deemed to be a supplement to public en-
forcement of competition law, but it is also noted, that "the litigants' priorities and mo-
tivations may not always be consistent with the government agencies' views on 
competition policy."156 
(a) Actionable conduct 
According to sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act any violation of "the antitrust 
Jaws" may be subject to a private action. 157 The term "antitrnst laws" as defined in sec-
tion 1 of the Clayton Act comprises the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. The Federal 
Trade Commission Act is not included in this definition and, therefore, cannot be en-
forced by private parties. 
153 See 16 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Section 0.14 concerning the organization of the Federal 
Trade Commission. 
154 15 USC Section 15 reads: "a) Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who shall be injured in 
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any 
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an 
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him 
sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee ." 
155 Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy - The Law of Competition and its Practice (West Pub-
lishing, St. Paul , MN, United States, 1994) 543. 
156 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Background Report on the Role of 
Competition Policy in Regulato,y Reform (Michael Wise, peer reviewed in June 1998 in the OECD's 
Competition Law and Policy Commjttee) 17 <ht~·" "' .occd.org dataoecd }._2_4 ]497266.pdf.> (last 
accessed 7 October 2003). 
157 Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides : "Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled 
to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the par-
ties, against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws, including sections 13, 14, 
18, and 19 of this title, when and under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against 
threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity, . .. ", 15 USC Section 
26. 
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(b) Standing to sue 
According to the simple language of section 4 of the Clayton Act, a private plaintiff 
is only required to claim injury to his business or property caused by someone else ' s 
antitrust violation in order to have standing. However, United States courts have estab-
lished several limits on private standing to sue under the Clayton Act. In Blue Shield of 
Virginia v McCready , the Supreme Court stated that " there is a point, beyond which the 
wrongdoer should not be held liable" and that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that Con-
gress did not intend to allow every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation 
to maintain an action to recover threefold damages for the injury to his business or prop-
erty."1 58 One reason for the limits on private antitrust enforcement ri ghts has been the 
concern that the potential windfall of mandatory treble damages plus attorney's fees to 
prevailing plaintiffs encourages not only justified claims but also strategic or frivolous 
1. · · 159 1t1gat10n. 
An essential element of antitrnst standing is that the plaintiff must have suffered 
"antitrnst injury". 160 The United States Supreme Court introduced this concept in 
Brunswick Corp. v Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, In c. in 1977.
161 The Court rejected the damage 
claim brought by a competitor of the alleged contravener because it found that the plain-
tiffs injury was due to an increase of competition arising from the conduct of the defen-
dant. The Court held, that 
"Plaintiffs to recover treble damages ... must prove more than inju ry causa lly linked 
to an illega l presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove antitrust inj ury, which is to 
say injury of the type the antitrnst laws were intended to prevent and that fl ows from 
that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The inju ry should re fl ec t the anti com-
petitive effect either of the vio lation or of the anticompetiti ve acts made poss ible by 
the vio lati on." 162
 
158 Blue Shield of Virginia v McCready ( 1982) 457 US 465, 4 77, c iting Illinois Brick Co , .. Illinois ( 1977) 
43 1 us 720, 760. 
159 Ernes t Ge llhorn & William E Kovac ic Antitrust law and Eco110.»1ics (4 ed, West Publ ishing, St. Paul 
MN, United States, 1994) 462; Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy The law of Competi-
tion and its Practice (West Publishing, St. Paul , MN, United States, 1994) 543 . 
160 There is some debate whether anti trust inj ury is an element of standing or rather an ana lytica lly di stinct 
requirement, see E T homas Sull ivan & Jeffrey L Harrison Understanding Antitrust And Its Economic 
Implica tions (3 ed, M atthew Bende r, ew Yo rk, nitcd States, 1998) 45; th is paper applies a broad 
concept o f 'standing' , therefo re "antitrust injury" is trea ted as an e lement of stand ing. 
16 1 Brunswick Corp. v Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc. (1 977) 429 US 477. 
162 Brunsll'ick, above, 489. 
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Antitrust injury refers to the nature of the plaintiffs injury. The courts have used 
the antitrust requirement to S(rike out complaints from competitors, which, in fact, had 
been injured but by reason of an increase in competition resulting from the illegal con-
duct rather than as a result of a diminution in competition.
163 
According to the Supreme Court's decision in Cargill, Inc. v Monfort of Colorado, 
Inc., the antitrust injury standard also applies to private claims for injunction.
164 The 
Court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate a threat of antitrust injury in order to have 
standing to sue for injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act. 
United States comis have developed other judicial rules further limiting antitrust 
standing, but with little consistency in tests and results. 165 Some of these limitations are 
reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in Associated General Contractors of Cali-
fornia, Inc. v California State Council of Carpenters, where the court made an attempt 
to elaborate a generalized standing test. 166 In this case, the Court denied standing to a 
labour union, which claimed that the defendant non-union employers had coerced gen-
eral contractors and landowners into employing non-union rather than union contractors. 
It stated that standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act should be determined by apply-
ing the following factors flexibly on a case-by-case basis: (1) whether the plaintiffs 
injury is of the type Congress sought to redress; (2) whether the defendant intended to 
ham1 the plaintiff; (3) the directness or indirectness of injury; (4) the existence of other 
persons more directly injured who are likely to sue; and, (5) whether the claim involves 
speculative harm, duplicative recovery, or a complex apportionment of damages.
167 De-
spite the diversity of tests and limitation, the common notion seems to be that standing 
is limited to consumers or competitors in the market that is targeted by the alleged anti-
trust violation.
168 
163 Brunswick, above; Cargill, Inc. v Monfort of Colorado, Inc. (1986) 479 US 104, 107 ; A//antic Rich-
field Co. v USA Petroleum Co. ( 1990) 495 US 328. 
164 Cargill, Inc. v Monfort of Colorado, Inc. ( 1986) 4 79 US I 04 , 107. 
165 ec Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy - The Law of Competition and its Practice (West 
Publishing, St. Paul, MN, United States, 1994) 553-557 . 
166 Associated General Contractors of Cal!fornia, Inc. v California State Council of Carpenters ( 1983) 
469 us 519, 537. 
167 Associated General Contractors of California , above , 537-43 . 
168 Herbert Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy - The Law of Competition and its Practice (West Pub-
lishing, St. Paul, MN, nited States, 1994) 557; E Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L Harrison Understand-
ing Antitrust And Its Economic Implications (3ed, Manhew Bender, ew York, United States, 1998) 
44. 
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(c) Remedies 
1n the United States private action enforcing the antitrust laws can be either for 
treble damages of injunctive relief. Additionally, private antitrust plaintiffs may initiate 
a class action for injunctive or declaratory relief. However, since the antitrust laws do 
not govern class actions, they are not subject to this examination.
169 
(i) Injunctions 
According to section 16 of the Clayton Act, "any person, finn, corporation, or asso-
ciation" can sue for injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of 
the antitrust laws". Private plaintiffs may also obtain an interim or "preliminary" injunc-
tion if they execute "proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently 
granted and ... [show] that the danger of irreparable loss or damage [from the antitrust 
violation] is immediate." However, section 16 does not allow the seeking of injunctive 
relief on behalf of the public. To become entitled to injunctive relief, a plaintiff must 
show that he or she is threatened with a special injury differing from that, which might 
be suffered by the public at large. 170 A plaintiff who successfully obtains an injunction is 
entitled to collect attorney's fees from the defendant. 
(ii) Treble damages 
If a plaintiff satisfies the requirements for standing, he or she is entitled to "three-
fold the damages by him sustained" plus attorney fees pursuant to section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act. Since the multiplying effect triggers automatically, it is not to the court's or 
jury's discretion whether damages are to be trebled or not. The judge simply multiplies 
the jury's award by three. Damages are calculated either from the difference between the 
competitive price and the 'overcharge' price the plaintiff was forced to pay or from the 
lost profits of the plaintiff due to an antitrust violation.
171 Up to date statistical data on 
private treble damages awards granted by United States courts is sparse. One reason for 
this is that a high percentage of private antitrust suits are either settled or dismissed be-
169 In the United States, class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 
FRCiv P 23. 
170 Revere Camera Co. v Eastman Kodak Co. ( 1948) 81 F Supp 325, 331 (ND lll). 
17 1 Herbeit Hoven.kamp A11turus1 (2 ed, West Publishing, St. Paul , M , United States, 1993) 293-4. 
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fore trial.
172 However, private treble damage actions often follow successful public en-
forcement action.
173 For exa1nple, in the aftermath of the vitamin-cartel-proceedings 
against F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd Roche, BASF AG, and others, private parties 
brought civil suits against these companies seeking treble damages and received several 
million dollars in a settlement. 174 
III COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
A The Role and Importance of Public Enforcement 
In all three jurisdictions in this study the public sector plays a predominant role in 
competition law enforcement. This is not only shown by the kind of remedies available 
and the deterrence flowing from them but also by the administrative mechanisms and 
quasi-judicial powers that facilitate the public sector's enforcement activities. 
First, the public sector has more deterring remedies available than the private sec-
tor. In New Zealand, Germany, and the United States, the public sector has the exclusive 
power to recover substantial penalties or fines. New Zealand's Commerce Commission 
may seek a maximum penalty of the greater of $10 million or either three times the ille-
gal commercial gain or 10% of annual turnover of a corporate contravener. The highest 
single pecuniary penalty ever imposed on a corporate offender amounted to $1.5 mil-
lion.175 The German Federal Cartel Office can punish serious administrative offences by 
a fine of up to EUR 500,000, and, in excess of this amount, up to three times the illegal 
proceeds. This surcharge rule has enabled the Office to impose record fines totalling 
approx. EUR 660 million in cartel proceedings in April 2003. In the United States, the 
Antitrust Division can seek criminal fines for corporate offenders in an amount equal to 
the largest ofUS$10 million or twice the illegal gain derived from the crime or twice the 
172 According to Steven C Salop & Lawrence J White "Treble Damages Reform: Implications of the 
Georgetown Project" ( l 986) 55 Antitrust Law Journal 73, 77, the settlement rate lies between 70 and 
80 per cent. 
173 Spencer Weber Waller "The Incoherence of Purnshment in Antitrust" (2003) 78 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review 207,210. 
174 Michael Freedman "Here Comes Treble" (27 August 2003) <hllp: w w v. . f"orbcs .com 2 00] 
Ojs :.7 c;__D1 1~ll{2 7 ant 11rust.html> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
175 Commerce Commission" Taylor Preston Limited & Ors (No.2) ( l 998) ZBLC 102,598-599. 
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pecuniary loss caused to the victims. 176 The largest fine ever imposed in a criminal 
prosecution on a single offendP.r has been an impressive US$500 million for a corporate 
offender. 
Private actions, though a common feature of all jurisdictions, have not resulted in 
damage awards that are even close to the amount of fines imposed by the public agen-
cies. In New Zealand and Germany, no specified sum of damages has ever been granted 
to a private plaintiff for a contravention of competition law. The research has revealed 
that, for different reasons, a future increase in damage awards is unlikely in both coun-
tries. In the United States, a private action for damages could theoretically approach the 
level of public penalties due to the treble-damages-trigger of section 4 of the Clayton 
Act. However, this is unlikely against the background that treble damages are one part 
compensation and only two parts penalty. Moreover, private damage awards are con-
fined to the illegal gain made at the expense of the individual plaintiff, not the illegal 
gain made by the defendant overall. 
Secondly, the public sector has more far-reaching remedies at its disposal than the 
private sector. The public enforcement agencies of New Zealand, Germany, and the 
United States have the exclusive power to obtain (or, in Germany, to make) orders di-
recting positive acts to restore competition in a market, namely dissolution and divesti-
ture orders. 177 In the United States, the Antitrust Division can even seek imprisonment 
for individual offenders as violations of the Sherman Act are considered criminal felo-
nies. Private plaintiffs, by contrast, are largely confined to actions for damages and in-
junctive relief 
Thirdly, the agencies of all three jurisdictions are vested with a quasi-judicial power 
to issue cease and desist orders without having to convince a court that this relief is ap-
propriate. While this power is confined to prohibitive (or sometimes formative) orders 
in New Zealand and the United States, Germany's competition enforcement regime pro-
vides for more far-reaching powers. As the only agency in this study, the Federal Cartel 
Office may, by its own power, impose administrative fines without having to take the 
case to the court. 
176 18 USC Section 3571 ( d). 
177 Commerce Act 1986, s 85(1); s 41(3) GWB; s 15 Clayton Act, 15 USC Section 25 . 
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Lastly, the public sector can benefit from an array of different administrative 
mechanisms to assist it in exercising its enforcement powers. The enforcement agencies 
of all countries are vested with comprehensive powers to investigate potential contra-
ventions. Moreover, ew Zealand's Commerce Commission has been relieved of the 
requirement to give an undertaking as to damages when applying for an interim injunc-
tion. Likewise, the Antitrust Division does not have to provide security or bond against 
damages for an improvidently granted temporary restraining order under section 15 of 
the Clayton Act. 
B The Role and Importance of Private Enforcement 
The three jurisdictions in the study each attach a different degree of importance to 
private enforcement of competition law. 
Among the three countries, the United States has probably gone farthest in this re-
spect. The availability of treble damages plus a reasonable attorney' s fee has proven a 
powerful incentive to sue and private actions have contributed significantly to antitrust 
jurisdiction in the United States. Private actions have constituted in excess of 90 % of 
all antitrust cases in the past 25 years and outnumbered public sector actions by a ratio 
of 9: 1. However, private enforcement of competition law in the United States does not 
seem to contribute much to achieving the ultimate goal of competition, which is to the 
benefit of the consumer. The issues in treble damage actions are narrowly confined to 
conduct that injured the plaintiffs. The same is true in actions for injunctive relief. Pri-
vate parties are not granted open standing to sue, as they are in New Zealand . To obtain 
injunctive relief, they must prove that they were subjected to threatened injury by the 
alleged contravention of the antitrust laws. The threatened injury must be "special," in 
the sense of being different from that, which might be suffered by the public at large.
178 
The private right of action, therefore, appears to be an egoistic rather than an altruistic 
enforcement tool. 
ew Zealand, in contrast, has so far rejected the introduction of multiple damages 
as a private enforcement remedy, but has granted the private sector a larger role in pro-
tecting the public interest. Under the Commerce Act, private parties have open standing 
178 Revere Camera Co. v Eastman Kodak Co ( 1948) 8 1 F Supp 325, 33 1 ( D Ill) . 
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to claim for injunctive relief. Applications may be made by any person, which would 
include, for example, consumer groups and trade associations. Applicants are not re-
quired to prove that they were injured by the alleged contravention or possess an other-
wise special interest in the application. Furthem1ore, courts must consider the interests 
of consumers when determining whether to grant an interim injunction in a private ac-
tion.179 Finally, since its amendment in 2001, the Commerce Act provides for exemplary 
damages to be granted to private plaintiffs by the courts. However, while private parties 
have, to some extend, contributed to antitrust jurisprndence via actions for injunctive 
relief, they, so far, have not had great success in obtaining damages awards. 
In Germany the private right of action plays an almost negligible role in competi-
tion law enforcement. Although the GWB provides for private claims for damages and 
injunctions this feature has rarely been used and has, therefore, contributed little to anti-
trnst jurisdiction in Germany. One reason for this phenomenon can, most likely, be seen 
in the comprehensive decision-making power of the Federal Cartel Office and the deter-
rence flowing from its penalty notices and other orders. 
IV REFORM OPTIONS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
A Room For Further Improvements 
New Zealand amended the Commerce Act only recently in 2001. Therefore, the 
new features of the Act such as increased corporate penalties and exemplary damages 
should be given sufficient time to prove (or disprove) their usefulness. However, the 
research has shown that by now doubts are justified whether these new enforcement will 
. . d b h M . . f C 180 bring about an increase 111 deterrence as envisage y t e m1stry o ommerce. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider further refom1 options for New Zealand's 
competition Jaw enforcement regime, which might become relevant if the 'deterrence 
gap' cannot be closed in the future . The preceding synopsis and comparative analysis of 
competition law enforcement in ew Zealand, Ge1many, and the United States has pre-
179 Commerce Act 1986, section 88(3A). 
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sented some alternatives for the New Zealand regime. The following part closely exam-
ines two aspects taken from those regimes and explores the question as to what extend 
each might serve as a model for further refonn of the ew Zealand system. 
B Option No 1: Increased Competences oftlte Commerce Commission 
The first refom1 option to be considered is to confer additional decision-making 
power to the Commerce Commission, more precisely the power to impose pecuniary 
penalties. The model is this case is the respective competence of the German Federal 
Cartel Office. The reasons for such a change and its advantages as well as potential con-
cerns will be assessed underneath. 
1 Reasons and advantages 
The analysis above has shown that by comparison New Zealand does not lack tough 
penalty provisions as a public enforcement remedy. The United States maximum nu-
meralised fine is only twice (if converted) as high as its New Zealand counterpart, which 
is not such a big difference taking into account the countries' economies and the average 
volume of business transactions. The German maximum fine is only one tenth of the 
New Zealand maximum. Still, the German Federal Cartel Office has been able to im-
pose large and deterrent penalties without much delay and often without subsequent 
litigation. This paper has revealed that in penalty cases New Zealand parties tend to set-
tle their cases with the Commerce Commission and that the Commission is able to set 
penalties at a reasonable but deterrent level. In fact , such agreed penalties presented to 
the courts by the Commission have been higher (thus, more deterrent) than court-
imposed penalties. Moreover, the Commission has indicated that it could have obtained 
even larger penalties but has been hindered from doing so by the availability of smaller 
court-imposed penalties.
181 Instead of considering further tougher penalties, it , therefore, 
seems appropriate to review the processes and the division of powers under the Com-
180 NZ Ministry of Conunerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under Th e Commerce Act I 986: A 
discussion doc11111 e111 (Ministry o f Commerce, We llington, January 1998) 3, 4 
<http~ \\·v.,, .mc_d .12.Qvl.ll/ tiuslt buuoI 12..:naltH?S JJ_df> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
181 z Commerce Commiss ion Penalties. Remedies and Court Processes under th e Commerce Act 1986 
(Submiss ion to Mini stry of Commerce, March 1998) para 21 <http : W\\ v. .comcQ.lll.fill" t. 
n/ publn:_atrnnS:(icthk.C' I vJ'ID_o_Lll) 65&1 ·ilrnamc Pf· Al I Y.PDI >. 
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merce Act and consider the confennent of the power to impose penalties to the Com-
m1ss10n. 
(a) Speed and efficiency gains 
To confer the power of imposing fines to the Commission would bring about an in-
crease of speed and efficiency in penalty proceedings. It would reduce friction losses 
resulting from the existing two-step approach and lead to more appropriate, presumably 
higher and more deterrent fines. 
The Ministerial discussion document of 1998 revealed procedural shortcomings re-
lating to Commerce Act cases, especially inefficiencies in court processes. The most 
obvious concerns were the delay, uncertainty and complexity associated with Commerce 
Act case proceedings.
182 A general issue was the cognition that courts, by their very na-
ture, are less flexible in the so-called "justice versus efficiency of process trade-off'.
183 
The main reason for this is that one can seek judicial review of an unjust decision rather 
than on the grounds that a court was inefficient.
184 Consequently, courts accept delays 
resulting from strict adherence to specific orders for court processes rather than risking 
an efficient but possibly unjust process. However, the 2001 Commerce Act amendment 
left the judicial system untouched. 
The Giltrap proceedings between 1994 and 2002 serve as an illustrative example of 
the delay and intricateness associated with penalty proceedings under the Commerce 
Act. This case involved proceedings against Giltrap City Limited ("GCL") for price fix-
ing in breach of sections 27 and 30 of the Act. In 1993 eight Toyota car dealers had en-
tered into an arrangement to fix the price of new Toyota motor vehicles. The 
Commission commenced proceedings in 1994 and in 1996 seven defendants admitted 
liability and each were fined 50,000.
185 GCL, however, continued to defend the pro-
ceedings. After lengthy procedural challenges
186 the case was partly heard in September 
181 NZ Ministry of Commerce, above, 3. 
183 NZ Ministry of Commerce, above, 47, referring to an examination of the civil justice system in Eng-
land and Wales conducted by Rt Hon the Lord Woolf "Access to Justice" (July 1996). 
184 NZ Ministry of Commerce, above, 50. 
185 The Commission entered into a settlement with the dealers, see Z Ministry of Commerce, above, 54 
(Appendix 2). 
186 These challenges involved, 111ter alia, civil procedure rules concerning evidence of subpoenaed wit-
ness, see Commerce Com1111ssio11 1• Ctlm1p Clfy Ltd & Anor (30 August 2000) 14 PR Z 450; the 
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2000, recommenced in February 200 I with final submissions delivered in March 2001. 
The Court delivered its judgn,ent in September 2001, declaring that GLC, in fact, had 
entered into a price fixing arrangement. 187 However, it took another five months until 
the High Court in Auckland made a detennination as to penalty (in this case NZ$ 
150,000.188 
In addition to the length of the proceedings, Giltrap also resulted in a penalty, 
which was significantly lower than what the Commission had requested.
189 Although 
the Court agreed with the Commission that numerous factors were in favour of a large 
penalty,190 it considered itself being barred from fully taking into account the financial 
resources of the defendant to justify a higher penalty than those imposed on the other 
seven defendants. Glazebrook J found that he could not use this factor because the 
Commission had not made such a differential when setting penalties for the seven other 
dealers in the negotiated settlement although there had been indications as to different 
financial resources of those defendants. 191 Thus, ultimately the two-step approach, the 
time span, and the different types of dispute resolution (settlements in 1996, penalties 
set by Commission versus litigation between 2000 and 2002, penalty set by the Court) 
caused a friction loss, which in this case materialised in a less than appropriate pen-
alty.192 
If it were up to the Commission to impose penalties, it would not have to wait for 
court hearings being scheduled. Under a simple set of procedural rules, which provide 
for a fair trial but also set deadlines for submissions, it could largely avoid the delays 
resulting from the strict adherence to High Court rules and obstructive defendants . The 
example of the Gennan Federal Cartel Office has shown that it is possible to finalise 
penalty proceedings within less than a year since the beginning of an investigation and 
to impose rigorous penalties, which are not opposed by the accused.
193 
If the penalty 
question whether to trea t one witness as hostile, Commerce Commission v Ci/trap City Ltd & A nor ( 19 
September 2000) High Court Auckland CP 88-94 Glazebrook J; an applicat ion for non-suit, see Com-
merce Commission v Gil trap Ciry Ltd & A nor (200 I) 15 PR Z 410. 
187 Commerce Commission v Gil trap City Ltd ( 13 September 200 I) I O TCLR 190. 
188 Commerce Commission v Gil trap City Ltd (2002) I O TCLR 305. 
189 See this paper, above, 11 A 3 a). 
19° Commerce Commission v Ci/trap Cil)1 Ltd, above, 3 19. 
191 Commerce Commission v Ci/trap City Ltd, above, 3 19. 
192 Even Glazebrook J indicated that he would have imposed a higher penalty if he had deemed it possi-
ble, Commerce Commission v Ci/trap City Ltd, above, 3 19. 
193 See thi s paper, above, II B 2e). 
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could be imposed without much delay, it would also be more efficient in tem1s of deter-
rence. First, (potential) offe.1ders would see the punishment following the offence 
promptly. Secondly, an offender should not enjoy the use of the money he or she owes 
to the state as a penalty longer than absolutely necessary. Granted, if a long enough time 
lies between the violation and the judgment, an offender might even be able to 'refi-
nance the penalty' by benefiting from interest rates or lucrative investments. Speedy 
penalty proceedings would deprive the offender of these benefits. Moreover, the addi-
tional deterrence won from this tempo gain would possibly supersede the frequent need 
to increase maximum penalties just to induce courts to impose higher penalties. 194 
(b) Knowledge and expertise 
To confer the power of imposing fines to the Commission would also mean that the 
public body, which is most familiar with the case and which has the most general expert 
knowledge would make the decision. 
The Commission is more familiar with a particular case than any court because it 
has conducted the investigation. During an investigation the trained Commission staff 
can require persons to furnish information, produce documents or give evidence. The 
Commission may also require persons to appear before the Commission and give evi-
dence under oath. A Commission employee may also, under a search warrant, search the 
premises of an alleged contravener for documents and other things, inspect documents 
and take copies. Other sources of information and evidence of a contravention are so-
called 'Whistle-blowers', who are encouraged to inform and cooperate with the Com-
mission under its Leniency Policy. 195 The first-hand information obtained from these 
sources enables the Commission to carefully assess the case taking into account all rele-
vant circumstances. 
In addition, the Commission has, by its very nature, more general economic exper-
tise than High Court judges. This expert knowledge, represented by its qualified and 
194 This correlation effect has already been doubted to occur, see Jill Mallon & Jenny Stevens "Penalties 
for Corporate Offenders" [200 l] ew Zealand Law Journal 389, 390. 
195 The Leniency Policy of the Commerce Commission 1s currently under revision, see <http : w,w .. com-
c_om.g<l\ t.n/ abouL (jocumcnts_ krncnc;. 12oh c_j:. pdf> ( last accessed 7 October 2003). 
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experienced members and staff, 196 contributes to finding the most appropriate remedy in 
a particular case. An analysis of court decisions reveals no evidence that the High Court 
has made poor decisions because of lack of economic expertise. However, it cannot be 
denied that the High Court is not a panel of experts predestined to decide complex 
commerce cases. New Zealand High Court judges are generalists and not specifically 
trained judges like, for example, the members of the cartel division of the OLG Diissel-
dorf.197 It has been this lack of expertise that has led to the New Zealand legislator pro-
viding for expert lay members to sit with a High Court judge pursuant to section 77, 78 
of the Act. Unfortunately, there have been problems in the past in assembling a Court 
for Commerce Commission cases due to the unavailability of lay members.
198 However, 
as Connor has pointed out, it were these very lay members that have been praised for 
being responsible for some high quality judgments of the High Court.
199 So, there is 
something to be said for the predestination of the Commission to assess and decide on 
penalties. 
In practice the Commission could benefit from the extensive list of factors Courts 
have developed and which have to be taken into account when determining the appro-
priate amount of a penalty. Again, the German experience shows that this is possible. To 
determine the amount of an administrative fine, the Federal Cartel Office has applied 
factors, which are more or less the same as the factors used by ew Zealand courts. In 
summary, the closeness with the case in question and its natural expertise predestine the 
Commission not only to make a specific charge, but also to make an appropriate deci-
s10n. 
196 Section 9(4) of the Commerce Act 1986 requires that members of the Commission have lmowledge of 
( or experience in) industry, commerce, economics, law, accountancy, public administration, or con-
sumer affairs; see also <http_:_ W\H\ .corncom.\!OVl.n,(about ~tratc_g) .cfrn> (last accessed 7 October 
2003). 
197 Geoff Connor, Delegate from cw Zealand, in a discussion concerning "The Role of Economics and 
Economists in Competition Cases" in OECD Competition Policy Roundtable "Judicial Enforcement of 
Competition Law" (OCDE/GD(97)200, 1997) <httr:1: ,\, \\~\ l .occd.01:&daf\:lp Ro_un~ltabk~ Jug()4. 
111 \,1 > (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
198 Jan Millard "Penalties and Remedies" in Mark Berry & Lewis T Evans (eds) Competition Law at the 
Tltm of th e Centwy - A New Zealand Perspective (Victoria niversity Press, Wellington, 2003) 194, 
212 ; see also NZ Ministry of Commerce Penalties. remedies and court processes Linder The Com-
merce Act I 986: A discussion docL1m e11t ( M1111 stry of Commerce, Wellington, 1998) 49, 50. 
199 Co1rnor, above. 
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2 Possible concerns 
(a) Conflicts of interest and natural justice 
Regarding the introduction of cease and desist orders there have been concerns that 
this additional power would lead to an inherent conflict of interest of the Commission 
resulting from its joint roles as a investigator, prosecutor, and judge in the same mat-
ters.200 It has also been questioned whether such orders would infringe ss 25 and 27 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, in particular the principle of natural justice.201 
These concerns would arise all the more if the additional power to impose penalties 
were to be conferred to the Commission. 
Section 25 of the Bill of Rights Act provides for the "minimum standard of criminal 
procedure". It, inter alia, stipulates: " Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in 
relation to the determination of the charge, the following minimum rights: (a) The right 
to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court: [ ... ]" It, therefore, 
might be concluded that a public body that has prosecuted an offence, could never con-
stitute an independent and impartial tribunal or court . However, the requirements of 
section 25 apply to criminal procedure. Contraventions of the Commerce Act do not 
constitute criminal offences, unless explicitly specified .202 Moreover, the enforcement of 
Commerce Act provisions largely follows the rules of civil proceedings. In particular the 
standard of proof for penalties proceedings under the Act is the ordinary civil stan-
dard.203 Consequently, when sought for an opinion on cease and desist orders, the Attor-
ney-General of New Zealand advised that such orders did not infringe the ew Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act. 204 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights Act 1990 does not contain a gen-
eral principle or provision, which requires that functions and powers of a judicial nature 
200 New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR) "Submiss ion to the Conu11erce Select Conmi.ittee on the 
Supplementary Order Paper amending the Commerce Amendment Bill" (Wellington, September 2000) 
7, paras 5, 6< htt :. v. W\\'. n~!;:>r.or_g,_n/u~1c_umen_Lli: ?u'2m1~iQllS: '>ubm1s_s1011<,-2000 com1rn:rce ~Q!U2..ll r 
(last accessed 7 October 2003); Ian Millard "Penalties and Remedies", in: Mark Berry & Lewis T 
Evans (eds) Competition law at the Turn of the Centwy-A New Zealand Perspective (Victoria Uni-
versity Press, Wellington, 2003) 194, 2 12; Brooker ·s Gault 0 11 Co 111111ercial law (Brookers, Welling-
ton, 1994, Commerce Act 1986) vol 1, 3-274( b) , para CA74A.05 (last updated 13 March 2003). 
20 1 Brooker ·s Gault 011 Co111111 ercial la w, above, 3-274(a), para CA 74A.05. 
202 See Commerce Act 1986, ss 80E( 1 ). 86. 
103 See Commerce Act 1986, ss 80( 3 ), 808( 3 ), 83( 3 ). 
20.i Brooker ·s Gault on Co111111ercial law, above, 3-274(a), para CA 74A.05 . 
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must be administered only in the courts.205 So, it is not unsafe to assume that an addi-
tional power of the Commerce Commission to impose penalties would not infringe sec-
tion 25 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 
Section 27 of the Bill of Rights Act provides for the "right to justice". It reads: 
(I) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by any 
tribunal or other public authority, which has the power to make a determination in respect of 
that person's rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
(2) Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law have 
been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public authority has the right to 
apply, in accordance with law, for judicial review of that determination. 
The concept of 'natural justice' basically requires the observance of procedural due 
process by administrative authorities whose decisions will (adversely) affect an existing 
right, interest or expectation of a person. 206 The two core elements of natural justice are: 
that parties be given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and that the decision-
maker be disinterested and unbiased. The concept of 'natural justice' and the content of 
its rules are considered to be flexible and its individual requirements depend on the cir-
cumstances of the case and the subject matter.207 
To comply with the requirement of a fair hearing the procedure for the imposition 
of a penalty could be modelled after the German proceeding, which includes a full hear-
ing, the right to comment, access to documents, and the principle of nemo tenetur.
208 
However, the joint roles of the Commission as an investigator, prosecutor, and 
judge in the same matter could raise doubts as to impartiality. Impartiality means that 
the decision-maker must not be biased. According to the rule nemo judex in causa sua -
no one may judge his or her own cause - a decision-maker is biased when he or she has 
a personal interest in the case. 209 The Commerce Commission, per se, is a public body 
205 For example, Articles 34 and 37 of the Constitution of Ireland essentially contain such a principle; the 
Irish Competition Authority, therefore, cannot itself impose fines for 111fringements of national compe-
tition law. 
206 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (2 eel, Brookers, Wellington, 
2001) 847-8. 
207 Joseph, above, 848; Andrew S Butler & Petra Butler The Laws of New Zealand: Human Rights (Lex-
isNexis, Wellington, 2003) 135 para 155. 
~os See this paper, above, II B 3 (b). 
209 Geoffrey A Flick Nawral J11s11ce: Principles and Practical App!tca11on (2 eel, Buttef\vorths, Sydney, 
Australia, 1984) 147etseq. 
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corporate, which is mandated to act solely in the public interest and is believed to have 
"as little as no incentive to tchave opportunistically".210 It is a popular misconception 
that competition authorities have a private or personal interest to impose penalties and 
fines. In fact, they do so solely because it is their statutory mandate or, simply put, "their 
job". 
Challenges of impartiality, however, can also be based upon an alleged prejudgment 
of the merits of a particular case. Such prejudgment could flow from the prior involve-
ment of a decision maker with the facts of the case he or she is later called upon to de-
cide. 211 However, it is widely acknowledged that this presumption is to some extend 
eased when it comes to decisions in an administrative process.212 First, the fact that an 
agency has conducted the investigation does not necessarily mean that the minds of its 
members are irrevocably closed to the merits of a case or to persuasion. 213 In this regard, 
it should be borne in mind that the Commerce Commission has no incentive to behave 
opportunistically or to pursue private interests. Secondly, the ri gid adherence to a strict 
separation of powers within an administrative process strongly reduces its efficiency.2 14 
It is just not possible to leave every administrative detem1ination to the judiciary, which 
possibly touches on the rights of the defendant . The ew Zealand legislator has ac-
knowledged this and, for example, has accepted a joint role of prosecutor and judge in 
the area of infringement offence notices (also known as " instant fin es").21
5 Government 
agencies may investigate and prosecute infringements such as traffic matters, resources 
management offences and biosecurity offences and subsequently impose fines for such 
infringements.2 16 The United Kingdom, where the idea of the incompatibility between a 
prosecuting and a judging role was ' borne' ,217 has recently furth er diluted this rule for 
efficiencies sake. According to sections 25 , 36 of the Competition Act, the Director 
210 Brooker 's Gault on Commercial Law (Brookers, Wellington, 1994, ommerce Act 1986) vol I, 302, 
para CASS.OS (last updated 13 March 2003); Ian Millard "Penalties and Remedies" in Mark Berry 
& Lewis T Eva ns (eds) Competition Law at th e Tum of th e Centun · A New Zealand Perspecti l'e 
(Victoria Uni ve rsity Press, Wellington, 2003) 194,2 10. 
2 11 Flick, above, 164. 
2 12 Flick, above, 164. 
213 Flick, above, 166-169 . 
214 Flick, above, 165 . 
215 David Wilson "Instant Fines: Instant Justice? The Use of Infringement Offence otices in ew Zea-
land" (200 J) 17 Social Policy Journal of ew Zealand 72; fo r the 111 fnngcmcnt process see Summary 
Proceedings Act 1957, s 2 1. 
2 16 Wilson, above, 72, 73, 76. 
217 J R s Forbes refers to three ancient English cases as the source of this rule, m J R S Forbes Ju stice in 
Tribunals (The Federation Press, ydney, Australia, 2002) 249 para 15.43. 
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Genera l of Fair Trade has the power to investigate suspected infringement of the Act as 
well as the power to impose impose a penalty if he is satisfied that an infringement has 
been committed.
2 18 
So it seems that concerns as to an infringement of natural justice are 
not so large that they should hinder New Zealand to follow the United Kingdom in this 
respect. 
(b) Parties will appeal every time 
Finally, there is a theoretical concern that offenders will not accept decisions of the 
Commerce Commission and will appeal on a regular basis. If that were the case, nothing 
much would be gained because then time-consuming court proceedings would protract 
proceedings even more and hearings would be doubled. However, there are some indi-
cations that this trend is not likely to emerge. The research has shown that in the past the 
Commerce Commission has settled the majority of penalty cases and has presented the 
Courts with a negotiated penalty. Apparently, the Commission has been able to find a 
penalty, which the offenders frequently found appropriate so that they saw no need to 
appeal and let a judge decide. This capability of competition authorities to assess and set 
penalties and fines at an appropriate level is further evidenced by the practice of the 
United States antitrust enforcement agencies. The Antitrust Division has obtained most 
of its large fines through Plea and Sentencing Agreements; and civil antitrust investiga-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission frequently result in consent decrees. 
C Option No 2: Multiple Damages 
The second option for a further reforn1 proposed by this paper is the introduction of 
treble damages to efficiently promote the private enforcement of competition law in 
New Zealand. The model is this case is the respective private right of action in the 
United States. Again, the reasons for such a change and its advantages as well as poten-
tial concerns will be assessed subsequently. 
2 ,s Competition Act 1998 ( UK), ss 25 , 36, see <http: \\ \\ \\ h11N1 gm uk ac:ts_ acts_l 99X I lJ9X0041.11tm> 
( last accessed 7 October 2003 ). 
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I Reasons and advantages 
As the comparative analysis has revealed, ew Zealand opted for a cooperative en-
forcement of competition Jaw between the public and private sector when it introduced 
the Commerce Act in 1986. Unless this 'enforcement philosophy' is to be abandoned, 
any reform of the enforcement regime should consider the further strengthening of the 
private right of action for its merits such as disburdening public enforcement authorities 
and achieving additional deterrence. Before the 2001 amendment, Ministry analysis 
showed that the remedy of private damages suits failed to achieve sufficient deterrence 
and there is a strong likelihood that exemplary damages will not close the deterrence 
gap either. 21 9 Although it is presumably too early to assess the effects the 2001 amend-
ment will have, it is not too early to evaluate a potential solution to the question of how 
the private sector should be equipped to achieve sufficient deterrence. The potential 
solution considered in the following is a multiple damages provision. 
(a) Certainty for the parties 
One advantage of a multiple damages provision modelled after section 4 of the 
Clayton Act would be an increase of certainty for the parties. If the damage multiplica-
tion triggered automatically, plaintiffs could figure out what their gain would be once 
they have established their claim. Under the present system, private parties are commit-
ted to the court's discretion in awarding exemplary damages and have to wait till the 
very last minute of the final judgment to see whether their efforts will be rewarded. Cer-
tainty as to the amount of damages one can expect would not only increase business 
predictability for potential plaintiffs, but would also reduce the complexity and costs of 
litigation.220 In particular, plaintiffs would not have to plead why and to what extent 
multiple damages are appropriate, but could concentrate on proving the damage sus-
tained and the causal connection between the contravention and the damage. As the pa-
per has shown the latter has proven to be quite difficult for private plaintiffs. Moreover, 
an automatic trigger for multiple damages would also do away with the difficulty for the 
2 19 See this paper, above, 11 A 4 b) iv . 
220 E Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L Harrison U11dersw11d111g Antitrust and Its Eco1101111c Implications (3 
ed , Manhew Bender, 'ew York, United States, 1998) 39. 
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Courts as to how to quantify the exemplary or non-compensatory component of the total 
amount of darnages. 221 
(b) Increased deterrence 
Another advantage of an automatic damage multiplier would be that it is more ca-
pable of achieving the deterrence objective than exemplary damages. It creates a strong 
incentive for private suits because of the potential windfall for the plaintiff. Statutory 
'guaranteed' multiple gains from a private action are much more attractive to a plaintiff 
than the dim prospect of being awarded (presumably low) exemplary damages. Thus, 
the incentive to overcome the difficulties in investigating potentially anti-competitive 
conduct and proving damages and a causal connection is much higher. The counterpart 
of such increased incentive to sue would be an increase in deterrence. The deterrence 
would not only flow from actual damage suits but also from the mere availability of 
such threatening private enforcement tool. Moreover, ew Zealand Courts would be 
freed from their constraints pertaining to the award of exemplary damages (award only 
in the most outrageous cases, traditionally small awards in commercial cases) and could 
impose higher damage awards than in the past. All this would make private damage 
actions a powerful enforcement tool, which would disburden the enforcement authori-
ties. Another beneficial side effect would be that private damage suits could likely con-
tribute more to the development of New Zealand competition jurisdiction than they have 
d · h 222 one m t e past. 
2 Possible concerns 
During the discussion preceding the 2001 amendment of the Commerce Act, the 
Ministry of Commerce had considered the introduction of treble damages but ultimately 
rejected the idea because treble-damages might lead to overlitigation and over-
ni NZ Ministry of Commerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act I 986: A 
discussion document (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, Janua,y l 998) 34 <http \,\ \\\\ me<) , 
l!O,t.n1 buslt buLJ)Ol pcnaluc .pdl> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
m See this pape1~ above, lI A 4 b) ii) . 
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detenence.
223 
Even in the United States, the treble damages remedy has not been with-
out challenge or controversy.224 
(a) Overlitigation 
It has been argued that treble damages encourage frivolous, meritless, and even stra-
tegic suits and, thus, lead to over-litigation.225 The Ministry of Commerce was also 
afraid that the strong incentive provided by treble damages would seduce potential 
plaintiffs to tum ordinary business tort or contractual claims into competition law 
claims.
226 
However, there are solutions to problems like this one. In the United States 
courts have been able to filter out meritless or non-competitive claims through the ap-
plication of special antitrust standing requirements such as ' antitrust injury' . Fim1s vic-
timized by frivolous treble damages actions are further protected by several rules of civil 
procedure, which provide sanctions for baseless suits and enable courts to di smiss mer-
itsless claims without the necessity of formal motion papers. 227 New Zealand courts 
could benefit from the highl y developed antitrust jurisprudence and experi ence with 
treble damages in the United States, and, thus, largely avoid the obstructions resulting 
from possible baseless or strategic suits. So this concern does not need to be a very con-
vincing argument against the introduction of multiple damages. 
(b) Overdeterrence 
A second concern with regards to multiple damages is that they might deter more 
than is actually required. As Cavanagh has pointed out, trebling damages could di scour-
age conduct, which is benefici al to competition rather than detrimental.228 Corporate 
managers may shy away from aggressive or vigorous competition fo r fear that their con-
223 z Ministry o f Commerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Acr 1986: A 
discussion document (M inistry of Commerce, Well ington, Ja nuary 1998) 36-7 <http: W\\ \\ .mcd. 
g0\t.n7 _guslt bus o l em:i lt1cs.pd f> (last accessed 7 October 2003) ; ins tead, the Mi nistry favo ured the 
idea to make pecuniary penalties ava ilable in private actio ns. 
224 E T homas Sulli va n & Jeffrey L Harri son Understanding Antitrusr and Its Economic Implications (3 
ed, Matthew Bender, ew Yo rk, United States, 1998) 38-9. 
225 Sulli va n & Harrison, above, 38-9: Edwa rd D Cava nagh "Detreb ling Antitrus t Damages: An Idea 
Whose Time Has Come?" ( 1987) 6 1 Tulane Law Review 777, 809-8 15. 
m z Ministry of Commerce, above, 37 ; see a lso Herbert Hovenka mp Federal Antitrust Policy Th e 
Law of Comperirion and lrs Practice (West Publ ishing, St. Pau l, M , United States, 1994) 543. 
m Fed R Civ p 11 , J6(c)( l ); sec also Edward D Cavanagh "Detreb ling Anti trust Damages: An Idea 
Whose T ime Has Come')" ( 1987) 6 1 Tu lane Law Review 777, 8 10- 1 I . 
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duct might overstep the bounds of legality. This could lead to less competition and sub-
sequently deny society the b~nefits of pro-competitive business practices.229 This argu-
ment, however, is highly theoretical in nature. 230 Statistical data or other empirical 
material that could prove this contention is not available.23 1 It is clear, that at one stage, 
the multiplication of damages, like for example by factor 20, will deter more than neces-
sary. According to the New Zealand Ministry, damages should be best set at the point 
where the marginal benefit from deterring illegal conduct equals the marginal cost of 
deterring legal conduct.
232 
However, it also admitted that it would be asking the courts 
to do too much to ask them to calculate or estimate the relevant marginal costs and mar-
ginal benefits. 233 Thus, a statutory damage multiplier at a reasonable level seems more 
appropriate and promising to achieve the deterrence objective. 
( c) Overcompensation 
Finally, treble damages have been called unfair because mandatory trebling may 
expose a plaintiff to high damage judgments that far exceed the scope of harm caused by 
a given defendant's wrongful acts. Moreover, plaintiffs are compensated in excess of the 
damages from actual injury ("windfall") and, thereby, "overrewarded".234 However, 
with regard to the US system, Professor Lande has revealed that these contentions are 
built upon a false foundation, namely the assumption that damages awarded to plaintiffs 
are threefold the damages sustained. 235 Relying on numerous studies, extensive statisti-
cal data and case material, Lande elaborated that there are seven factors that increase the 
actual damage sustained, which are not covered as 'damages' to be trebled under the 
228 Cavanagh, above, 801 et seq. 
229 Frank H Easterbrook "Detrebling Antitrust Damages" (1985) 28 Journal of Law and Economics 445, 
456-7. 
230 E Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L Harrison Understanding Antitrust and Its Economic !111plicatio11s (3 
ed, Matthew Bender, ew York, United States, 1998) 38. 
23 1 For example, Breit and Elzinga resort to economic theories, models and curves to illustrate this con-
tention, see William Breit & Kenneth G Elzi nga "A ntitrust Penalties and Attin1des Toward Risk: An 
Economic Analysis" ( 1973) 86 Harvard Law Review 693, 699 et seq. 
232 The Ministry applied Posner's and Becker's economic approach towards penalties, see NZ Ministry of 
Commerce Penalties, remedies and court processes under The Commerce Act I 986: A discussion 
document (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, January 1998) 7- 10, 37 <lillJ): \,\ \\,\~ .111L'5.L 
gQ, t.n/ l,)uslt gu~._Rol pcnalul's.pdf'> (last accessed 7 October 2003). 
233 z Ministry of Commerce, above, 38. 
n 4 E Thomas Sullivan & Jeffrey L Hamson Understanding Anlltrust and Its Economic Implications (3 
ed, Matthew Bender, New York, United States, 1998) 39: Robert H Lande "A re Antitrust "Treble" 
Damages Really Single Damages')" ( 1993) 5-t Ohio State Law Journal 11 5. 11 8. 
235 Lande, above, 118. 
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current system. These "adjustments" to the damage multiplier, inter alia, include: the 
lack of prejudgrnent interest raid to plaintiffs; non-recoverable costs of the plaintiff for 
pursuing a case such as hourly rates for employees conducting investigations; costs to 
the judicial system arising from handling often complex and lengthy antitrust cases; and 
umbrella effects of market power. 236 Lande concludes that, taking into account all the 
above adjustments, awarded damages in the United States have been at best equal to 
actual damages instead of trebling them. This shows that the 'overcompensation' argu-
ment is not quite convincing. Although it is certainly difficult to determine an appropri-
ate damage multiplier for New Zealand, Lande's writings provide guidance as to what 
should be taken into account to reach fair and efficient damages awards. 
V CONCLUSION 
The New Zealand Ministry of Commerce has made it clear that the Commerce Act 
needs to be efficiently enforced in order to be effective. When discussing an optimal 
enforcement regime for New Zealand, it must be further borne in mind that deterrence is 
the main objective of penalties and remedies under the Act and that enforcement proc-
esses should balance justice and efficiency. With the 2001 amendment of the Commerce 
Act, the New Zealand legislator has responded to deficiencies detected in this regard. 
However, this research has revealed that from today's point of view there are certain 
indications that the recent changes to the Commerce Act will not sufficiently remedy 
these deficiencies. The additional deterrence flowing from increased penalties and the 
availability of exemplary damages seems questionable. If this prediction comes true, the 
New Zealand legislator should consider further options for reforming its competition 
law enforcement system. 
In the past, foreign legislation (the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974) served as a 
model for New Zealand's antitrust law. Again , a look to other jurisdictions seems ap-
propriate and promising to identify enforcement features that could improve the New 
Zealand system. The German system relies heavily on public enforcement of competi-
236 Lande, above, 130, 142, 144, 147. 
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tion law and, therefore, has vested its enforcement agency, with far-reaching and quasi-
judicial powers to make its work efficient. Though fairly unfamiliar in the New Zealand 
system, this approach could be taken into account as a reform option because it has 
proven to be quite effective without denying offenders procedural due process or confin-
ing their right to appeal. A properly resourced enforcement agency with quasi-judicial 
powers seems like a straighter way to more appropriate remedies than the loop way via 
increased maximum penalties and the hope that courts will implement the legislative 
will. This paper further recommends a second look at a multiple damage provision simi-
lar to the treble damages section of the Clayton Act in the United States. The reasons 
why the New Zealand legislator initially rejected the idea of multiple damages, on a sec-
ond look, do not appear to be very convincing. If ew Zealand further wants to divide 
the burden of enforcement and deterrence onto two shoulders, the public and the private, 
a multiple damages provisions might remedy what the availability of exemplary dam-
ages might fail to do. 
Although the first option would require considerable changes to the structure and 
operation mode of the Commerce Commission and the second option would call for a 
careful application by the courts, the New Zealand Parliament should not hesitate to 
seriously consider these options. As the Ministry has put it, "penalties and remedies un-
der the Commerce Act should support the goals of the Act by deterring anti-competitive 
conduct"; and the foremost and ultimate goal of the Commerce Act is to promote 
competition in markets for the long-term benefit of consumers within ew Zealand . 
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